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REGULATING DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
Nathan Cortez †

ABSTRACT
Disruption theory tells us that certain innovations can undermine existing products,
firms, or even entire industries. Classic examples include the Kodak camera, the Bell
telephone, and the Ford Model T. Modern examples abound. The market entrant’s
innovation ultimately displaces industry incumbents. Regulators, too, are challenged by such
disruptive innovations. The new product, technology, or business practice may fall within an
agency’s jurisdiction but not square well with the agency’s existing regulatory framework.
Call this “regulatory disruption.”
Most scholars intuit that regulators should be cautious rather than firm in such
situations. Tim Wu, in Agency Threats, argues that agencies confronting disruptive innovations
should avoid traditional rulemaking and adjudication, and instead rely on “threats” packaged
in guidance documents, warning letters, and the like. Threats, he argues, are less
burdensome, more flexible, and avoid regulation that is miscalibrated or premature.
However, this Article argues that a flexible initial posture based primarily on “threats” can
calcify, creating weak defaults that lead to suboptimal regulation in the long term. Regulatory
inertia can be hard to break without an external shock, usually a tragedy or some other
massive failure that reignites interest in regulation. As a case study, this Article shows how
the FDA’s approach to a disruptive technology (computerized medical devices) twenty-five
years ago fits the threat framework strikingly well, and how it failed. The FDA’s threats
became stale and counterproductive—during a profound computer revolution, no less. This
Article counterposes the FDA’s approach to software with the FCC’s approach to the
Internet, which initially relied on threats, but later codified them via binding regulations and
enforcement shortly thereafter.
This Article argues that agencies need not be so tentative with innovations. If agencies
are concerned about regulating prematurely or in error, then they can experiment with
timing rules, alternative enforcement mechanisms, and other variations on traditional
interventions. If agencies do choose to proceed by making threats, then they should use
them as a short-term precursor to more decisive, legally binding action, as the FCC did, and
avoid relying on them as a long-term crutch, as the FDA did.
© 2014 Nathan Cortez.
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INTRODUCTION

A persistent challenge for regulators is confronting new technologies or
business practices that do not square well with existing regulatory
frameworks. These innovations can depart in important ways from older
incumbents. For example, the innovation might present unanticipated
benefits and risks. It might disturb carefully crafted equilibria between
regulators, industry, and consumers. The innovation might puncture
prevailing regulatory orthodoxies, forcing regulators to reorient their
postures or even rethink their underlying statutory authority. The
quintessential example is the Internet, which rumpled not just one, but
several regulatory frameworks, including those of the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”), the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”), and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).1
1. For the FCC’s experience adapting its longstanding regulatory framework to
Internet providers, see infra Section III.C. For the FTC’s experience adapting its
longstanding frameworks for privacy, marketing fraud, and antitrust violations to online
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Periodically, our economy generates these “disruptive innovations.”2
Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen introduced the idea to describe new
technologies that undermine and eventually displace established products,
firms, or even entire industries. Iconic examples include automobiles,
personal computing, and cellular phones. But the idea’s explanatory power
extends to many other products and industries. As a result, disruption theory
has inspired prolific writing in the business academy and now creeps into
other disciplines.3
Here, this Article uses the idea to refer to innovations that disrupt
existing regulatory schemes, not necessarily industry incumbents (though
they may do that too). Call this “regulatory disruption.” Legal scholars have
examined disruptive innovation in various disciplines, such as civil
activities, see, for example, Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net
Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1652–82 (2011) (comparing the
suitability of FCC regulation versus FTC antitrust jurisdiction in crafting net neutrality
policies); Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2041, 2053 (2000) (using public choice theory to explain the FTC’s approach to online
privacy); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 72 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1605–22 (2004) (considering in detail the FTC’s regulation of online
consumer fraud from a microeconomic and game-theoretical perspective). For an amusing
juxtaposition that highlights the friction between new technologies and older regulatory
frameworks, see Rep. George W. Gekas & James W. Harper, Annual Regulation of Business
Focus: Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 769, 772, 777 (1999) (juxtaposing
the heading “The Internet: Everything’s New!” with the heading “Government: Everything’s
Old!”). For the FDA’s early experience adapting its longstanding framework for regulating
pharmaceutical labeling and advertising to new online promotional practices, see Peter S.
Reichertz, Legal Issues Concerning the Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products on the Internet to
Consumers, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 355, 357–61 (1996); Marc J. Scheineson, Legal Overview of
Likely FDA Regulation of Internet Promotion, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 697 (1996).
2. See Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43, 45 (1995). Bower and Christensen did not
discuss the term “disruptive innovation” in their 1995 article, but Christensen’s follow-up
book, CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997), helped introduce and popularize the
term.
3. For example, Christensen and colleagues have applied disruption theory to health
care. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A
DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE (2009). An early application of disruption theory
to health care in the legal literature is Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman, Overregulation of
Health Care: Musings on Disruptive Innovation Theory, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2006). For
a thoughtful analysis of why health information technologies have yet to disrupt the U.S.
health care system, per Christensen’s criteria, see Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s
Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 NEV. L.J. 722 (2013). For a skeptical review of The Innovator’s
Prescription, see J.D. Klienke, Perfection in PowerPoint, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1223 (2009) (“Although
the book excavates several fascinating nuggets about wrenching changes in other industries,
it attempts to force each into Christensen’s franchise-in-progress, ‘disruption theory.’ ”).
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procedure,4 environmental law,5 and intellectual property.6 Health law
scholarship predominates the legal literature on disruptive innovation,7
perhaps because our dysfunctional health care system begs for
transformation.8 And, to be sure, there is no shortage of legal scholarship
examining technological innovation more generally.9 But no one has yet
applied disruption theory to the field in which it should be most useful—
administrative law. Administrative law scholarship contains a rich, sprawling
discourse on how agencies should regulate new markets.10 These questions,
incidentally, can be particularly vexing with categorically novel technologies
and business practices. Contemporary debates in administrative law thus map
well onto disruption theory, and for that reason it is worth merging the two
here.
The one scholar that comes closest to merging disruption theory and
administrative law theory is Tim Wu, in his recent essay Agency Threats.11 Wu
4. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May
Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case for
Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
829 (2008).
7. Indeed, of the forty-eight articles in the Westlaw database “Journals and Law
Reviews” (“JLR”) that cite one or more of Clayton Christensen’s publications on “disruptive
innovation,” roughly half of them are in the health law field (search conducted on Oct. 8,
2013).
8. Terry, supra note 3.
9. The vast majority of this scholarship focuses on intellectual property, for obvious
reasons. But some does not. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of
Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885 (2010).
10. The scholarship is too numerous to cite, but see, for example, Peter Huber, The
Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983) (considering flaws in how
Congress and federal regulators consider older, well-known risks versus newer, unkown
ones); Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 551 (2007) (deriving various lessons for policymakers after considering
past responses to new technologies); Thomas O. McGarity & Karl O. Bayer, Federal
Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1983) (considering whether
then-existing regulatory frameworks were adequate to regulate new genetic engineering
technologies); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885
(2001) (examining how legal institutions address “the threat of the new,” focusing mostly on
information technologies).
11. Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011). Daniel Gervais also tackles the
question of regulating what he calls “inchoate technologies,” distinguishing these from more
“stable” technologies. Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
665, 671 (2010). Like Wu, his treatment is somewhat Internet-centric. Gervais argues for a
general skepticism towards regulating inchoate technologies, and is less concerned with the
timing and form of intervention. As such, Gervais seems primarily concerned with whether to
regulate inchoate technologies, not how. Id. at 669. After these, the next closest to discussing
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does not invoke disruption theory per se, but does address how regulators
should confront novel technologies, business models, and practices.12 In
doing so, Wu engages a broader scholarly debate on the proper form of
agency policymaking.13 He argues that agencies should forgo traditional
policymaking tools like rulemaking and adjudication in favor of informal
“threats”—packaged in guidance documents, warning letters, and the like—
when confronting industries that face conditions of rapid change and high
uncertainty.14 An informal, elastic “threat regime” is preferable, he argues,
when agencies face dynamic rather than static industries characterized by
disruptive innovation, unexpected market entries, new business models, and
other exogenous shocks.15 More traditional regulatory interventions like
rulemaking and adjudication, the argument goes, risk being badly
miscalibrated, or premature, or both.16
This Article tests the argument for agency threats and offers some
important limitations. It argues that a regulatory threat works best as a
temporary stopgap that presages more traditional regulatory intervention, not
as a long-term strategy. Otherwise, the threat risks becoming stale or even
counterproductive. Resource-strapped agencies that employ threats (most
do) should guard carefully against relying on them as a long-term crutch. At
some point, regulators must regulate.
In short, this Article demonstrates that agencies need not be so timid
when confronting new technologies—even disruptive ones. If agencies are
concerned about imposing regulation that is miscalibrated or premature, then
they can reduce the cost of errors by using timing rules, alternative
enforcement mechanisms, and other variations that might “soften”
traditional regulation without undermining it long-term. In essence,
regulators can experiment with binding approaches that can be more finely
calibrated to the novel technology or business practice. The public interest
demands that agencies maintain their fortitude in the face of regulatory
disruption. And, somewhat counterintuitively, new technologies can benefit
disruptive technologies and regulatory responses is Donald Labriola, Dissonant Paradigms and
Unintended Consequences: Can (and Should) the Law Save Us from Technology?, 16 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2009), although the article focuses on behavioral and social psychology rather than
regulatory theory.
12. Wu uses the phrase “disruptive innovation” just once in Agency Threats, supra note
11, at 1848, and does not cite Christensen’s work. However, he has cited it in previous
writing. E.g., TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION
EMPIRES 20 (2010).
13. See also infra Section IV.B.
14. Wu, supra note 11, at 1842.
15. Id. at 1848–49.
16. Id. at 1849.
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from decisive, well-timed regulation. Some early regulatory interventions
might even become, in Daniel Carpenter’s words, “market-constituting,” by
enabling a robust market that otherwise might not exist, especially for
credence goods that are difficult for consumers to evaluate.17
To make these points, this Article evaluates how a traditional regulatory
agency, the FDA, has struggled to confront a technology that constantly
evolves and reinvents itself—software. The FDA, responsible for regulating
most new medical products, has spent the last century navigating waves of
innovation in the food, drug, and medical device industries.18 Indeed, one of
the agency’s major charges is to act as a gatekeeper for new medical
products.19
But computerized medical devices have confounded the agency over the
last twenty-five years, pushing the FDA far beyond its regulatory comfort
zone. The FDA first confronted computerized medical devices in the mid1980s, particularly after a series of patient deaths traced to the first radiation
machines controlled by software.20 Following these deaths, the FDA
published a 1987 draft guidance that explained what types of software the
agency would and would not regulate, including the requirements that might
apply.21 But the FDA relied on the draft guidance for the next eighteen years,
withdrawing the policy unceremoniously in 2005,22 leaving nothing in its
17. Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, in
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 164, 170
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010). As Carpenter explains:
[D]rugs are types of credence goods, whose quality consumers can assess
neither through inspection (as for “inspection goods” like a tomato) nor
experience (as for experience goods like a job). Such goods, social
scientists have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically, create
“lemons problems.” Because of informational shortcomings, consumers
will continually purchase or consume inferior products when superior
alternatives are available . . . .
Id. at 174.
18. See FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
(Wayne L. Pines ed., 2006) (discussing various historical accounts of the FDA’s response to
developments in the food, drug, device, and biologics industries).
19. See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (detailing an account of
the FDA’s gatekeeping role in pharmaceutical regulation).
20. For a fuller account of this incident, see infra Section III.B.
21. Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104
(Sept. 25, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Notice of Draft Policy]; FDA Draft Policy for the
Regulation of Computer Products (proposed Nov. 13, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Draft
Software Policy] (on file with author).
22. Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug
Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824,890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
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place. The FDA never promulgated comprehensive software regulations and
never even finalized the draft policy. All of this happened during a profound
computer revolution no less, when software became increasingly ubiquitous
and critical to patient safety. Today, the FDA repeats this pattern, releasing
guidance after guidance to address software technologies in medicine.23
The FDA’s approach to software over the last quarter century fits the
agency threat framework strikingly well. The software industry has always
been dynamic, not static. Many observers believe that recent software
innovations will disrupt prevailing health industry norms and practices.24 The
FDA faces conditions of high uncertainty, to risk understatement. And the
conventional wisdom has been that decisive software regulation by the
agency would be premature.25 So the FDA has relied on guidance documents
to explain its expectations. It has not made rules. It has made threats.
But looking back, the threats embodied in the FDA’s 1987 draft guidance
were largely empty. The FDA’s tentative, short-term approach to an
emerging technology calcified into a long-term default, ultimately leading to
suboptimal regulation for an entire industry. What started as a modest,
flexible response by the FDA, consistent with the agency threat framework,
became stale, ultimately undermining the agency’s long-term authority over
device software. This Article thus uses the FDA’s approach to software,
spanning a quarter century, to argue that agency threats are only useful as a
short-term stopgap that presages more decisive intervention.
This Article then counterposes this example to the FCC’s approach to
the Internet. The FCC used threats to enforce principles of Internet
neutrality against Internet service providers as an initial, short-term precursor
to more decisive rules and enforcement. In contrast, the FDA’s initial threats
became a long-term crutch with no hard law backstop. These two
approaches might be superimposed onto other examples, from the Federal
Aviation Administration (“FAA”) screening novel aircraft designs or flight
software, to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considering new
sources of pollution or anti-emissions technologies, to the Securities and
23. For example, in September 2013, the FDA published another guidance explaining
its approach to the latest generation of device software, embodied in mobile medical
applications for smartphones and tablets (called “medical apps” or more broadly, “mobile
health” applications). FDA, Mobile Medical Applications (Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter
Mobile
Medical
Applications],
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm263366.pdf.
24. See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 3; WILLIAM HANSON, SMART MEDICINE:
HOW THE CHANGING ROLE OF DOCTORS WILL REVOLUTIONIZE HEALTH CARE 3–16
(2011) (describing uses of software technology in modern medicine).
25. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) engaging novel securities instruments or
high-speed trading technologies. The FDA’s own experience in relying
primarily on guidance to confront novel things like genetically modified
foods, nanotechnology, and xenotransplantation, demonstrates both the
patterns and the stakes here.26 Somewhat counterintuitively, both the public
and the innovators can benefit from earlier, more decisive regulatory
interventions, per the FCC’s approach to net neutrality.
The Article begins in Part II by addressing “regulatory disruption,” the
idea that novel technologies or business practices can disturb existing
regulatory frameworks. Part III then considers agency threats as a response,
drawing on the FDA’s long struggle to regulate computerized devices as a
model to avoid, and the FCC’s recent battle for net neutrality as the model to
emulate. Part IV broadens this argument and assesses normatively how
agencies should address regulatory disruption. Agencies facing disruption
must make four related decisions, each of which is implicated when deciding
whether to use “threats”: (i) when to intervene, (ii) the form that intervention
should take, (iii) how durable or transitory that intervention should be, and
(iv) how rigorously to monitor and sanction noncompliance. “Threats” are
not just a decision about form, but also represent decisions about timing,
duration, and enforcement.
This Article argues that if agencies are concerned about regulating new
technologies or business practices in error, or prematurely, then they can
experiment with alternative timing and enforcement methods to reduce these
risks while maintaining regulatory fortitude. Agencies can experiment with
binding regulation. For example, agencies might use regulatory sunsets to
better calibrate how long the intervention endures. Agencies could also
specify rulemaking deadlines to make good on initial threats. And citizen
suits or private rights of action could help correct systematic
underenforcement by resource-strapped regulators.
II.

DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION

In 1995, Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen introduced the idea of
“disruptive technologies” that depart fundamentally from existing ones,
usually by being less complicated, more accessible, and less expensive.27
Disruptive “technologies”—later broadened in the literature to disruptive

26. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm
Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH., no 4, Spring 2006, at 1, 22–35, 45, 60–63.
27. Bower & Christensen, supra note 2.
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“innovations”—undermine and then displace incumbents.28 Classic examples
include the Kodak camera, Bell telephones, Sony transistor radios, the Ford
Model T, and Xerox photocopiers.29 Contemporary examples include Cisco
routers, Fidelity mutual funds, Google advertising, and the Southwest
Airlines business model.30 In each case, the market entrant introduced an
innovation that eventually, though often not immediately, changed the entire
market. The innovation “disrupts” the market in unforeseen ways.
This Article merges disruption theory with theories of regulation, using
the idea of disruptive innovation to consider how regulators should respond
to novel technologies or business practices that do not fit comfortably within
their regulatory frameworks. The innovation typically falls within a specific
agency’s jurisdiction, but does not fit well within the agency’s regulatory
schemes that contemplate more established technologies or business
practices. The innovation “disrupts” the regulatory framework, not
necessarily industry incumbents, as envisioned by Bower and Christensen.
“Regulatory disruption” occurs, then, when the “disruptee” is the regulatory
framework itself.31
Certainly, there have been iconic innovations that did not fall within an
existing agency’s jurisdiction, eventually prompting Congress to create
entirely new agencies. For example, the birth of commercial aviation during
the barnstorming 1920s coincided with the birth of the Bureau of Air
Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and other precursors to the
modern Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).32 The parallel evolutions
of the automobile industry and the U.S. interstate highway system led
Congress to create the National Highway Safety Agency, the precursor to the

28. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 2, at XV.
29. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.
30. Id.
31. Daniel Gervais addresses his analysis to “inchoate” technologies, which are
fledgling technologies that have yet to mature. He does not focus his analysis explicitly on
“disruptive” innovations, although he also seems to contemplate technologies that do not fit
well into existing regulatory frameworks. See Gervais, supra note 11, at 671–72.
32. See generally Miranda Anger, International Aviation Safety: An Examination of the U.S.,
EU, and the Developing World, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 141, 142–49 (2007); Frederick A. Ballard,
Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1235 (1947). For a fascinating history of the
government’s unique role in innovation in the commercial airline industry, see David C.
Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The Commercial Aircraft Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND
TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 101–61 (Richard R. Nelson ed.,
1982).
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and the
Department of Transportation.33
But this Article is not concerned with innovations that have no
regulatory “home,” as these generally require congressional intervention to
assign jurisdiction. Agencies cannot address them sua sponte.34 The U.S.
regulatory state has aged out of its formative years, when Congress created
most modern regulatory agencies.35 Today, there are hundreds of federal
agencies, departments, and commissions,36 many of which enjoy sweeping
jurisdiction. For that reason, few innovations today will emerge without a
regulatory “home” (or even multiple “homes”) completely beyond every
agency’s jurisdiction. The contemporary challenge, then, is how existing
agencies can confront these innovations given their broad but sometimes
inert statutory frameworks.

33. Ralph Nader’s famous book, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN
DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965), amplified growing public demand for
auto safety regulation, leading Congress to pass the Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89–564, 80 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 401–404 (2012)), the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30,101–30,126, 30,141–30,147, 30,161–30,169 (2012)), and the
Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966). In parallel,
Congress confronted pollution by motor vehicles with the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 87-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), which vested regulatory authority with
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”). In 1969, Congress
created the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321–4347), which was later reorganized by executive order into the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966–1970),
reprinted in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). For a history of the government’s role in facilitating
innovation in the automobile industry, see Lawrence J. White, The Motor Vehicle Industry, in
GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at
411–50.
34. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (striking
down the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products without explicit congressional
authority to do so).
35. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded
Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362 (2010) (describing an early history of administrative agencies); Jerry
L. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–
1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration
and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE
L.J. 1256 (2006); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189 (1986) (describing a broader period-by-period history of federal regulation).
36. See Federal Agencies and Commissions, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.white
house.gov/our-government/federal-agencies-and-commissions (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
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Perhaps the best modern example is the Internet. Since 1934, the FCC
has had jurisdiction over communications networks.37 But the
Communications Act addressed a world of circuit-switching on telephone
lines operated by monopoly “common carriers,” not the future world of
decentralized, digitized, packet-switching run by a constellation of smaller
Internet service providers.38 When this world began to emerge in the 1980s
and 1990s, the FCC “self-consciously adopted a policy of non-regulation.”39
But the FCC’s posture of separating “telecommunications services” from
“information services” became less and less tenable as the Internet began to
mature in the 1990s.40 By then, it was clear that Internet service fell within
the FCC’s jurisdiction. But it did not square well with the FCC’s longstanding
framework.41
Another immediate example of disruptive innovation is the avalanche of
novel securities instruments that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. For
years, financial firms had been experimenting with new and sometimes exotic
securities products, particularly over-the-counter derivatives like mortgagebacked securities, credit default swaps, and collateralized debt obligations.42
In the 1990s, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)
considered using its existing jurisdiction to regulate the derivatives market,
until Congress intervened to bar it, at the behest of key regulators like
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Robert

37. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)) (“An Act to provide for the regulation of
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes.”).
38. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal Service
Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211,
211–12, 215–18 (1999) (juxtaposing Internet technologies with the regulatory framework
created by the Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC).
39. Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 529, 531
(2009) (internal quotations omitted).
40. See Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1763–64 (2011); see also
Weinberg, supra note 38, at 212, 232–34; Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, supra note 39,
at 531.
41. See infra Section III.C (discussing the FCC’s response in further detail).
42. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT, at xxiv (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [hereinafter FCIC FINAL REPORT] (reviewing financial
products and their contribution to the financial collapse of 2008); see also Brooksley Born,
Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231
(2011). For an entertaining popular account of these novel securities and those who created
them (and the few that actually understood them), see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT:
INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
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Rubin.43 Greenspan, a well-known laissez faire economist, pushed
deregulation and self-regulation in the derivatives market, strongly resisting
the CFTC’s efforts to act on concerns that the market posed broad, systemic
risks.44 In the years leading up to the housing and stock market crash in 2008,
the derivatives market would balloon to $673 trillion in notional amount.45
In the wake of the economic crisis, Congress created the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) to investigate the root causes of the financial
collapse.46 The FCIC attributed the collapse in part to the weak response by
regulators to these novel financial products and practices. For example, the
Federal Reserve Board had refused to use its authority to regulate aggressive
new mortgage lending practices.47 The Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) had failed to enforce disclosure requirements for mortgage-backed
securities.48 Congress had pushed to deregulate novel over-the-counter
derivatives.49 And regulators like the SEC, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)
exerted only superficial oversight of the banks engaged in these activities.50
The FCIC’s final report found that “[t]echnology has transformed the
efficiency, speed, and complexity of financial instruments and transactions,”
but that the United States “had a 21st-century financial system with 19thcentury safeguards.”51
43. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15 U.S.C.). Before that,
Congress imposed a moratorium on the CFTC action. Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277 § 760, 112 Stat. 2681-1,
2681-35 (1998). For a description of the role Rubin and Greenspan, among others, played in
this matter, see FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 47. The over-the-counter derivatives
market is one innovation that Wu concedes might have benefited from more traditional early
regulation. Wu, supra note 11, at 1850.
44. Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greenspan.html (quoting
congressional testimony of Brooksley Born, then chair of the CFTC, that the opaque
derivatives market could “threaten our regulated markets or, indeed, our economy without
any federal agency knowing about it.”); Born, supra note 42, at 236–38 (quoting Greenspan’s
testimony to Congress urging that regulation was unnecessary for over-the-counter
derivatives).
45. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xxiv.
46. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 5(a), 123 Stat.
1617, 1625.
47. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xvii; Born, supra note 42, at 234–35.
48. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 169–70; Born, supra note 42, at 235–36.
49. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xxiv–xxv; Born, supra note 42, at 236–38.
50. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xviii, 150–54, 173–174, 302–04; Born, supra
note 42, at 238–42.
51. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xv, xvii, xx.
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These stories tell the modern predicament: how do regulators with broad
statutory authority manage innovations as they mature, and as their problems
become apparent?
III.

EMPTY THREATS?

If certain innovations do not square well with existing regulatory
frameworks, how should agencies respond, sans congressional intervention?
This Part first considers the argument that agencies should rely on informal
threats rather than more traditional modes of regulation. It then
demonstrates how the FDA took precisely this approach with computerized
devices twenty-five years ago, which led to suboptimal regulation of
increasingly ubiquitous and dangerous products. This story cautions against
over-relying on regulatory threats. Part III concludes by counterposing the
FDA’s approach to software with the FCC’s use of threats to address
Internet networks, which was disciplined by early enforcement and
rulemaking to codify its threats. Unlike the FDA, the FCC did not over-rely
on threats.
A.

AGENCY THREATS

The agency threat framework argues that federal agencies should use
informal “threats” against regulated industries under conditions of “high
uncertainty.”52 For example, an agency might announce via guidance
document, warning letter, or press release that it will take action against
companies that employ novel technologies or business practices in a certain
way.53 But this type of regulatory elasticity, as demonstrated below, can
harden into a long-term default position, leading to suboptimal regulation if
not disciplined in some way.
An agency makes a “threat” when it gives “at least some warning of
agency action related to either ongoing or planned behavior.”54 Agencies can
package threats in many forms—guidance documents, interpretive rules,
warning letters, press releases, official speeches, and even private meetings
with regulated firms.55 Threats can be very public, as a press release, or very
52. Wu, supra note 11, at 1848 (defining “high uncertainty” as scenarios “in which
alternative future states of the world do not occur with quantifiable probability”).
53. Id. at 1841, 1844.
54. Id. at 1844.
55. Id. Some of these vehicles themselves come in many forms. For example, guidance
documents can include enforcement guidelines, policy statements, interpretive rules and
memoranda, agency staff manuals and circulars, private ruling letters, informal advice, etc.
See Final Bulletin, Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007);
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386, 1391
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private, as a face-to-face meeting.56 Either way, the threat specifies behavior
that the agency either desires or forbids.57 Invoking a notorious example, Wu
gives a nod to Don Corleone’s use of threats in The Godfather.58
Regardless of their wrapping, threats are informal rather than formal, soft
law rather than binding hard law, and are issued without much procedure
(though they may be accompanied by quite a bit of ceremony).59 This, indeed,
is their appeal. Threats can issue without notice and comment or other
procedural hurdles required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or
other statutes.60 As such, threats serve as a third alternative to rulemaking and
adjudication, the two classic modes of regulation.61 According to Wu, Peter
Strauss, and other advocates of informal agency action, threats occupy “an
important element in the hierarchy of agency law.”62 On this I agree.
Wu also contemplates threats as being unenforceable by agencies,63
though ambiguity on this point seems to be the point. Otherwise, what is the
agency threatening? The agency threat specifies either desired or forbidden
behavior, and at least hints at potential repercussions. Threats, in short, are
assertions that the agency will do something at some point given certain
triggering activities. A threat that is unenforceable on its face would not seem
to appeal to many agencies.
(2004). A 2007 Executive Order by the Bush administration defined “guidance document”
as “an agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory
action, that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an
interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.” See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191–
92 (2007) (rescinded by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010)).
56. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844.
57. Id.
58. Wu stops short of suggesting that agencies rely on some of the more aggressive
tactics used by the mafia. See id. at 1857 (referencing THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures
1972)).
59. Id. at 1844. “Soft law” is described in Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law:
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008).
60. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and
the LikeShould Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1328, 1334–
35 (1992); Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1380 (2011); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 874–76 (1997); Lars Noah, The
Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 901, 904–05 (2008).
61. Wu, supra note 11, at 1841.
62. Gersen & Posner, supra note 59, at 626; Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803,
804 (2001); Wu, supra note 11, at 1847; David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294,
294 (2006).
63. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1846.
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Threats are useful, according to their proponents, under conditions of
high uncertainty, and for dynamic rather than static states of industry.64 Thus,
for relatively stable industries in which business models, practices, and
technologies are relatively well settled, agencies have enough information to
regulate with certainty.65 Legally binding rules make sense. Agencies can
activate the lumbering machinery of rulemaking or adjudication without
worrying that the effort will be for naught, or that “law” they produce will
soon be obsolete. But in dynamic industries—characterized by disruptive
innovation, unexpected market entries, new business models, and other
exogenous shocks—agencies may lack sufficient information to regulate with
certainty.66 Doing so risks creating rules that are miscalibrated, or premature,
or both.67
According to the threat framework, agencies face three choices when
confronting dynamic states of industry: make law, make threats, or do
nothing.68 Again, making law via traditional rulemaking or adjudication can
be premature or simply may generate flawed rules. And somewhat ironically,
making law may create more uncertainty by triggering judicial challenges that
can take years to resolve.69 Doing nothing, or waiting, can also be undesirable
because the industry may develop outside the public eye, and without
considering the public interest.70 Moreover, as the industry matures, the more
settled its norms and business practices will become, which can be hard to
reverse later.71
Threats, the argument goes, allow agencies to oversee the formative years
of an industry without suffocating it.72 Agency threats themselves can

64. Id. at 1848.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1849.
67. Id. Although Wu does not discuss Clayton Christensen’s “disruptive innovation”
framework in Agency Threats, supra note 11, he does address it in a separate work. See WU,
THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 12, at 20.
68. Wu, supra note 11, at 1848–49. This list generally parallels the four choices David
Super identifies when agencies must make decisions that appear to be unusually costly: (i)
devote the resources necessary to make the decision, (ii) make a low-quality decision based
on the limited decisional inputs it can muster, (iii) postpone a decision to when it has better
decisional inputs, or (iv) do nothing. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1375, 1407 (2011).
69. Wu, supra note 11, at 1849.
70. Id. at 1850. Gervais, conversely, argues that social norms and sometimes the
technology itself will fill the regulatory void. Gervais, supra note 11, at 668.
71. Wu, supra note 11, at 1842, 1854.
72. Id. at 1851.
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generate a public debate, which often contemplates the public interest.73 And
the lack of formality makes the threat quicker to issue and more flexible than
rulemaking or adjudication.74 If the threat turns out to be too harsh, or not
harsh enough, the agency can easily retreat or recalibrate.
Proponents argue that the criticisms of agency threats are overblown.
Rather than being a procedural end-run around the APA, an amplification of
statutory authority, a way to skirt judicial review, or even an affront to the
rule of law itself,75 agency threats are precisely what agencies should use in
conditions of high uncertainty. According to Wu, we should stop worrying
and learn to love agency threats.76
This Article tests this argument by looking at two instances of agencies
relying on threats in responding to disruptive technologies: the FDA’s
response to software and the FCC’s response to the Internet. It is striking
how closely the FDA’s approach to software fits the threat framework. The
medical device software industry has always been relatively dynamic.77 The
pace of innovation seems to be forever quickening, not abating, as evidenced
by the latest generation of medical software for mobile devices.78 To say that
the FDA is facing conditions of high uncertainty is to risk understatement.79
Moreover, frequently we hear the chorus that FDA rulemaking for software
would be premature, due to the agency’s lack of expertise, its lack of
resources, and the state of the industry.80
73. Id. Gervais worries that quickly-developing social norms will evolve to circumvent
any new regulatory framework. Gervais, supra note 11, at 673.
74. Wu, supra note 11, at 1851.
75. Id. at 1846–47. Wu focuses particular attention on Lars Noah’s criticisms, supra
note 60, which survey the range of problems and recent examples of abuse.
76. Wu, supra note 11, at 1842; see also Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions Sans Frontières (or
How I Stopped Worrying About Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare
Delivery), 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 183 (2004); DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I
LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964).
77. Nathan Cortez, Analog Agency in a Digital World (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (tracing the development of early medical device software to the present
day, and the FDA’s regulatory response).
78. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1173
(2014) (surveying mobile medical applications and other mobile health technologies and
examining their significance).
79. The FDA itself emphasizes the high uncertainty in its guidance for mobile medical
applications, noting the “extensive variety of actual and potential functions of mobile apps,
the rapid pace of innovation in mobile apps, and the potential benefits and risks to public
health represented by these apps.” Mobile Medical Applications, supra note 23, at 4.
80. See, e.g., FDA Public Workshop-Mobile Medical Applications Draft Guidance, FDA, (Sept.
12–13, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/
ucm267821.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) [hereinafter FDA Public Workshop] (transcripts
available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/uc
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Consistent with the agency threat framework, the FDA did not make law.
Nor did it do nothing. It published several guidance documents. It made
threats. Moreover, these threats have at times generated public debate,
sometimes even including lengthy public comment periods.81 Finally, the
latest wave of medical software developers seems to prefer some guidance to
none,82 although unsurprisingly it wants more clarity. In short, the FDA’s
approach to software over the last twenty-five years demonstrates how an
agency relied on threats in precisely the circumstances described by Wu.
B.

THE FDA AND THE QUARTER-CENTURY-LONG THREAT

Overburdened agencies like the FDA have long embraced informal
threats. But there can be too much of a good thing. For twenty-five years, the
FDA has relied on threats to address software in medical devices. This
history cautions that threats can become stale and even counterproductive.
As with many regulatory interventions, the FDA’s foray into device
software was prompted by tragedy.83 The story begins in 1985, when a
Canadian company began selling the first therapeutic radiation machines
controlled primarily by software.84 Between 1985 and 1987, the machines
massively over-radiated several patients in the United States and Canada,
killing at least six.85 The injuries were attributed to various software design
flaws and user errors.86 When the FDA investigated these incidents, it
required the manufacturer to make certain corrections, which were not fully

m275908.htm and http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConfere
nces/ucm275909.htm).
81. Id.
82. The mHealth Regulatory Coalition objected to the Bennett-Hatch amendment to
the FDA user fee bill that would have prohibited FDA from finalizing its Draft Guidance
for eighteen months. Letter from mHealth Regulatory Coalition to Senators Enzi and
Harkin (May 17, 2012), http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/
06/MRC-Letter-to-Senate-HELP-Committee-on-Proposed-Moratorium-FINAL.pdf.
83. The tragedy over thalidomide helped prompt the 1962 Drug Amendments.
CARPENTER, supra note 19, at 256–60; J. Richard Crout et al., FDA’s Role in the Pathway to Safe
and Effective Drugs, in FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 159,
168–69.
84. See generally Nancy G. Leveson, Medical Devices: The Therac-25, in SAFEWARE: SYSTEM
SAFETY AND COMPUTERS 515 app. A (1995) (providing a comprehensive story of the
Therac-25 saga). The FDA had begun considering software before the Therac-25, as shown
by its letters in response to congressional committees considering computers in medicine. See
Information Technologies in the Health Care System, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations and
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 99th Cong. 196–204 (1986). But the Therac-25 saga
seemed to push the agency towards announcing a policy towards software.
85. Leveson, supra note 84, at 515.
86. Id.
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implemented until two years later, after a recall.87 Yet, at the time, the FDA’s
response was considered “impressive,” given that it had no policy for
medical software.88
In 1986, FDA Commissioner Frank Young said in a speech that the
agency would approach device software with the “least regulation consistent
with the requirements of public health and safety.”89 This speech represented
the first threat, though the threat was a soft, imprecise one. In 1987, the
FDA published its first draft policy on software, explaining which types of
software the agency would and would not regulate, and which regulatory
requirements might apply.90
In 1989, the FDA updated the document, which became known as the
“Draft Software Policy.”91 The policy confirmed that the FDA’s “basic
philosophy for computer products” was “to apply the least degree of
regulatory control necessary to provide reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness.”92 Like the 1987 version, the 1989 policy delineated which
computer products the agency would and would not regulate.93 It clarified
how these new technologies might fit into the statutory definition of
“device,” which Congress wrote in 1976 when no one could have imagined
today’s versions.94 Together, the 1987 and 1989 draft software policies
constituted “threats,” consistent with the framework.
Since that time, the FDA’s approach to computerized medical devices
has been the archetype of regulatory minimalism. The agency never finalized
the 1989 Draft Software Policy; in fact, the FDA withdrew it without
explanation in 2005.95 In the absence of legally binding rules, lawyers have
87. Id. at 525, 544–48.
88. Id. at 553.
89. FDA & National Library of Medicine, Software Policy Workshop (Sept. 3–4,
1996), reprinted in FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE, BIOMEDICAL SOFTWARE REGULATION
403 (Thomas E. Colonna & Jonathan S. Helfgott eds., 2009) [hereinafter FDA & NLM,
1996 Software Policy Workshop].
90. 1987 Notice of Draft Policy, supra note 21; see also Medical Devices; Medical
Software Devices; Notice of Public Workshop, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,886 (July 15, 1996). The
FDA had begun crafting the policy in 1985. See FDA & NLM, 1996 Software Policy
Workshop, supra note 89, at 403.
91. 1989 Draft Software Policy, supra note 21; see Mobile Medical Applications, supra
note 23, at 6.
92. E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and Regulation of
Medical Device Software, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 513 (1997).
93. 1989 FDA Draft Software Policy, supra note 21.
94. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295 (1976) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)).
95. Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug
Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824,890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
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had to advise clients based largely on the 1989 draft policy, even after the
FDA withdrew the policy. The agency did pre-clear discrete software
products on a case-by-case basis, which could serve as precedent for similar
products.96 But this piecemeal approach fell far short of establishing a
definitive, cohesive philosophy towards software that companies could use to
predict their regulatory obligations.
Ironically, after the FDA withdrew the 1989 guidance, it explained that
“it would be impractical to prepare an overarching software policy to address
all of the issues related to the regulation of all medical devices containing
software” because “the use of computer and software products as medical
devices grew exponentially and the types of products diversified and became
more complex.”97 Thus, rather than providing more oversight as medical
technology matured—during a profound computer revolution—the FDA
provided less.
By and large, the FDA has avoided proceeding by rule here. It has
promulgated very few prospective regulations governing software, and what
little it has done addresses relatively low-risk devices.98 For example, in 2011,
the FDA finalized a rule governing medical device data systems. But these
represent only a narrow slice of low-risk products that merely transfer, store,
display, or convert medical device data, without doing much else.99
Periodically, in the preambles to final rules, the FDA will acknowledge
computer products. For example, when finalizing its Quality Systems
Regulation (“QSR”) for devices in 1996, the FDA observed that software
design flaws and the failure to validate software after maintenance were the
most common source of errors.100 The QSR, which establishes good
manufacturing practices for devices,101 has been perhaps the one area in
96. For example, the FDA has created dozens of regulatory categories for devices that
incorporate software, including medical calculators, cameras, lights, magnifiers, microscopes,
monitors, recorders, reminders, scales, surgical tools, and a host of data systems that store,
display, and manipulate data. Mobile Medical Applications, supra note 23, at 29–31 (listing
distinct device categories codified by FDA).
97. FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff:
Mobile Medical Applications, 5 (July 11, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Mobile Medical
Applications Draft] (on file with author) (superseded by Mobile Medical Applications, supra
note 23) (referring to the 2005 withdrawal of the 1989 Draft Software Policy).
98. For example, in 2011, the agency promulgated a rule classifying devices that
electronically display, store, transfer, or convert medical device data, known as Medical
Device Data Systems (“MDDS”). 76 Fed. Reg. 8637 (Feb. 15, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 880.6310 (2013)).
99. See 21 C.F.R. § 880.6310(a); 76 Fed. Reg. 8643–44 (Feb. 15, 2011).
100. Medical Devices; Current Good Manufacturing Practice (“CGMP”), 61 Fed. Reg.
52,602, 52,617, 52,620 (Oct. 7, 1996).
101. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 (2013).
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which the FDA has provided firm standards for software. But the QSR is
notable for giving manufacturers significant flexibility to design and
manufacture devices according to customized specifications.102 This is both a
strength and a weakness—a strength in recognizing the diversity of medical
devices and the implausibility of generating one-size-fits-all standards, but a
weakness in decentralizing standards and delegating significant discretion to
regulated firms. Of course, the FDA relies on guidance to explain how the
QSR applies to software.103
Indeed, the FDA heavily relies on guidance to oversee software. Agency
documents that summarize the FDA’s approach generally cite to the same
cluster of five guidances.104 Together, these documents form a cascade of
quasi-regulation, recommendations, and “current thinking,”105 but offer few
firm rules. Software does not stand on terra firma with the FDA. Looking
back, the 1987 document was like the gateway drug that led to guidance after
guidance for the next twenty-five years.
Unfortunately, the FDA’s response to software has not been
commensurate with how ubiquitous and critical to patient safety software has
become. Widespread problems with device software persist. For example,
between 2009 and 2011, the New York Times documented several hundred
catastrophic injuries caused by software and user errors related to the newest
generation of radiation machines.106 The incidents bear striking similarity to
the problems with radiation software that originally prompted the FDA’s
102. See Medical Devices Quality System (QS) Regulation/Medical Device Good Manufacturing
Practices, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Post
marketRequirements/QualitySystemsRegulations/default.htm (last updated Apr. 28, 2011).
103. See, e.g., FDA, General Principles of Software Validation (Jan. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulation
andGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm085371.pdf.
104. See FDA, Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf
(OTS) Software (Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm077823.pdf;
FDA, Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software Contained in
Medical Devices (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medical
devices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm089593.pdf; FDA, General
Principles of Software Validation, supra note 103; Guidance for Industry, FDA Reviewers
and Compliance on Off-The-Shelf Software Use in Medical Devices (Sept. 9, 1999), available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Gu
idanceDocuments/ucm073779.pdf; FDA, Design Control Guidance for Medical Device
Manufacturers (Mar. 11, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Medical
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm070642.pdf.
105. See, e.g., FDA, supra note 103, at 1.
106. See, e.g., Radiation Boom, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
us/series/radiation_boom/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (linking to twenty-six
articles in the series on medical radiation by Walt Bogdanich).
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intervention two decades earlier. In one case, a hospital in Manhattan
exposed a cancer patient to fatal doses of radiation for three consecutive days
after the software repeatedly crashed.107 The patient died two years later.108 In
another case, a Brooklyn hospital administered three and a half times the
prescribed dose of radiation to a breast cancer patient for twenty-seven days
due to user errors and misprogrammed software.109 The New York Times
documented hundreds of similar mistakes,110 with one expert estimating that
one in twenty radiation patients nationwide will suffer injury.111
Unfortunately, the FDA’s posture towards software is reactive rather
than proactive. To wit, the FDA subsequently investigated these radiation
software failures reported by the New York Times, but only after they
generated national attention.112
Yet, the FDA seems to be generally aware of the dangers posed by
software products. In February 2010, the FDA revealed during a public
meeting that it had received voluntary reports of 260 malfunctions, forty-four
injuries, and six deaths related to health information technologies.113 But
because these were voluntary reports, and because even the FDA’s
mandatory reporting requirements suffer from dramatic under-reporting, the
real numbers are no doubt much higher.114
These injuries are the byproducts of medical innovation. As alluring as
medical innovation is, it is not an unmitigated good. The role of regulators
like the FDA is to facilitate the benefits of new technologies while managing

107. Walt Bogdanich, Radiation Offers New Cures, and Ways to Do Harm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/health/24radiation.html.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“Over the previous eight years, despite hundreds of mistakes, the state issued
just three fines against radiotherapy centers, the largest of which was $8,000.”); Walt
Bogdanich, As Technology Surges, Radiation Safeguards Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/us/27radiation.html.
111. Bogdanich, supra note 107 (quoting Dr. John J. Feldmeier of the University of
Toledo).
112. Id.
113. Testimony of Jeffrey Shuren, Director, FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological
Health, Health Information Technology (“HIT”) Policy Committee, Adoption/Certification
Workgroup (Feb. 25, 2010) (on file with author).
114. See Edward M. Basile & Beverly H. Lorell, The Food and Drug Administration’s
Regulation of Risk Disclosure for Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators: Has Technology Outpaced the
Agency’s Regulatory Framework?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 251, 257–58 (2006) (“The [FDA]
estimates that as few as one in every 100 medical device adverse events actually is reported
to [the] FDA, although there is no hard data to support this estimate.”).
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their risks.115 Doing so should support rather than undermine long-term
markets for the technologies, preserve consumer trust, and level the playing
field among competitors. Facilitating new technologies need not be in
tension with managing their risks. The challenge for regulators is pursuing
both during early periods of high uncertainty.
C.

THE FCC AND THE SIX-YEAR-LONG THREAT

In contrast to the FDA’s quarter-century-long threat, the FCC took a
more disciplined approach when confronted with its own disruptive
innovation. Unlike the FDA’s initial “threat” in 1987, which lingered for
decades, the FCC’s initial “threat” in 2004—warning Internet service
providers to maintain net neutrality116—was quickly reinforced by
enforcement and, ultimately, by rulemaking just six years later. The
differences here are instructive. Like the FDA, the FCC was confronted with
a new technology that did not square well with its existing regulatory
framework. And like the FDA’s early posture towards software, the FCC’s
early posture towards the Internet was one of benign neglect.117 The lack of
high-profile problems seemed to justify this approach,118 perhaps as it also
justified FDA’s early stance towards software.
The Internet developed gradually as a government and academic network
between the late 1960s and the late 1980s.119 Since 1934, jurisdiction over
communications networks has resided with the FCC.120 As early as 1966, the
FCC foresaw the potential convergence between computers and
communications, initiating what it called the Computer I inquiry to study how
115. For example, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorizes the FDA to
pre-approve only new drugs that are safe and effective, which requires balancing their risks
and benefits. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
116. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844–45, 1852 n.41. Wu originally coined the phrase “net
neutrality.” See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141 (2003).
117. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, supra note 39, at 531, 533 (“To date, the
Internet has developed outside of the FCC’s traditional regulatory model, enjoying freedom
from regulatory oversight.”).
118. Id. at 537.
119. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999) (providing a
detailed historical account of the Internet); A Brief History of the Internet & Related Networks,
INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/
brief-history-internet-related-networks (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (providing a briefer
history). For a compelling account of the government support required to develop the
Internet and personal computing, see Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal
Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1999).
120. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“An Act to provide for the regulation of
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes.”).
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computers might both operate on and replicate traditional telephone
networks.121 As a result of the inquiry, the FCC “chose to quarantine data
processing from regulated telecommunications, rather than tackle the public
policy considerations of the nascent computer utility directly.”122
During the twentieth century, federal communications law developed
discrete regulatory regimes for discrete services, such as telephony, broadcast
television, cable television, and satellite.123 Internet Protocol transmissions
did not fit neatly, if at all, into these regulatory categories.124 The FCC’s
regulatory framework, based on the hoary Communications Act of 1934,
contemplated a world of circuit-switching on legacy telephone lines run by
monopoly “common carriers”; it did not anticipate (how could it?) the
decentralized, digitized, packet-switching Internet that later emerged.125
During the 1980s and 1990s, the FCC “self-consciously adopted a policy
of non-regulation toward the Internet during its emergence as an important
commercial network.”126 But as the Internet began to grow exponentially in
the mid 1990s, the FCC’s posture of separating “telecommunications
services” from “information services” became less and less tenable.127
Indeed, dividing the communications world by service category has become
obsolete with computer-to-computer communications that can now replicate
other categories of services.128 Thus, Internet service clearly fell within the
FCC’s jurisdiction. But it did not square well with the FCC’s longstanding
framework, based as it was on service categories. The categorical lines
evaporated with Internet technologies.
The FCC understandably struggled with whether to apply traditional
regulatory frameworks to a technology as dynamic as the Internet.129 Even
1996 legislation addressing Internet networks became outdated by the late

121. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communications Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966); see also Bickerstaff, supra
note 119, at 7–13 (recounting the FCC’s launch of the Computer I inquiry).
122. Werbach, supra note 40, at 1763.
123. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 213.
124. See id.
125. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 215–18 (juxtaposing Internet technologies with the
regulatory framework created by the Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC).
126. Weiser, supra note 39, at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 212, 232–34; Weiser, supra note 39, at 531; Werbach,
supra note 40, at 1764.
128. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 232–34.
129. Weiser, supra note 39, at 549–50.
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1990s.130 Internet scholars rehashed the familiar debate about whether
rulemaking or adjudication would be more effective.131
Eventually, Internet technologies and business practices matured enough
to warrant binding regulation.132 But the FCC proceeded initially by making a
threat. In 2004, FCC Chairman Michael Powell gave a speech at a popular
telecommunications conference, warning the broadband industry that it
should preserve net neutrality in various ways, such as allowing broadband
users to attach different devices to their networks and use Internet
applications of their choice.133
This threat turned out to be far from empty. Just one year after Powell’s
speech, the FCC initiated an investigation against a telephone company that
violated one of these principles.134 Of course, the FCC did not allege that the
company violated Powell’s speech. Rather, it cited violations of the
Communications Act of 1934.135 The FCC backed up its threat.
Moreover, the FCC elaborated on Internet freedoms in a policy
statement shortly after the settlement136 and promulgated a legally binding
rule just six years later, codifying the thrust of Powell’s original speech.137
Real enforcement was the third (and crucial) part of the FCC’s three-part
strategy to regulate the Internet.138 Adjudication and enforcement require
sustained effort.139 In comparison, the FDA has brought intermittent
130. Id. at 561 (“By the late 1990s, technological and market conditions had outpaced
the premises that underpinned the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”).
131. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 67
(2005); Weiser, supra note 39, at 563–64.
132. See Weiser, supra note 39, at 531 (arguing that early non-regulation of the Internet
by the FCC was appropriate, but now it is not).
133. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844–45 (citing Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC,
Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, Remarks at the Silicon
Flatirons Symposium on “The Digital Broadbrand Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime
for the Internet Age” (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf).
134. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1845 (discussing Madison River Communications, LLC,
20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4102/
m1/371.
135. Madison River, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4296 (citing the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 201(b)); Weiser, supra note 39, at 563.
136. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://digital.
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4091/m1/708.
137. Wu, supra note 11, at 1852; Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905
(Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc39308/m1/451.
138. See Weiser, supra note 39, at 584–89.
139. See id. at 585–86 (noting various deficiencies and underuse of the FCC’s
Enforcement Bureau and administrative law judges (“ALJs”)).
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enforcement actions against software products,140 but it has not brought
enough high-profile cases to offset its primary reliance on nonbinding (and
since withdrawn) guidance.
The FCC deployed threats as a short-term precursor to more traditional,
binding regulation; the FDA relied on threats as a long-term crutch. And
unlike the FDA, the FCC did not make empty threats. These disparate
experiences reveal important limitations on agency threats.
IV.

THE REGULATORY TOOLKIT FOR DISRUPTIVE
INNOVATIONS

By its nature, disruptive innovation challenges regulators. U.S. culture
values innovation, sometimes for its own sake, and does not want regulation
to be technologically regressive.141 At the same time, new technologies can
disturb existing regulatory frameworks, triggering intense public debates
about whether they are compatible with accepted social and legal norms.142
Instinctively, most assume that regulating novel technologies requires more
information and longer decision-making processes than familiar, established
technologies do.143
Compounding the challenge, regulators like the FDA and FCC must
make four different types of decisions when confronting novel technologies
or business practices. The decision to rely on agency “threats” is not only a
decision about the form of intervention, but also about the timing of
intervention, how durable that intervention should be, and how rigorously

140. For example, the FDA has an online database of warning letters issued to
suspected violators. It categorizes these warning letters by subject, with three relating to
device software: “Devices/Computer Software,” listing only two warning letters (one in
1997 and one in 1998); “Devices/Patient Monitors Software,” listing one warning letter
from 1999; and “QSR for Medical Devices/Picture Archiving & Communication Systems
Software/Adulterated,” listing one warning letter in 2001. FDA’s Electronic Reading Room–
Warning Letters, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/warningletters/wlFilter
BySubject.cfm (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (follow hyperlinks from subject index to individual
subjects). Of course, these database categories may not be comprehensive, and a search
through the FDA’s warning letter database for “software” generates many more results
(although some of these do not concern software devices, but software used for
manufacturing or other reasons).
141. See Huber, supra note 10, at 1028.
142. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial
Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2002).
143. Cf. Super, supra note 68, at 1411, 1416–17 (noting that “commentators assume that
more information is an unalloyed good” and that “delaying decision making is necessary to
allow procedures consistent with careful deliberation or broad participation,” while new
technologies can “complicate” and “chang[e] the optimal timing of” decision-making).
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the agency should monitor and sanction noncompliance. The regulator thus
makes four related types of decisions:
1. Timing: When should the agency intervene, if at all? Does waiting
necessarily generate a better informational basis on which to regulate?
What are the drawbacks of waiting?
2. Form: Should the agency regulate via rule, adjudication, guidance, or
some alternate form? Given the costs and benefits of each, which
best accommodates the uncertainties of the innovation? Does form
even matter?
3. Durability: Should the agency’s intervention be permanent, or
temporary, or conditional? How long should it endure? And are there
ways to better calibrate regulatory interventions to the innovation?
4. Enforcement: How rigorously should the agency monitor and
sanction noncompliance? How much should agencies temper
enforcement against novel products, firms, or industries?
With each decision, an agency must prioritize competing claims on these
questions by different constituents, including Congress, the President,
industry, and regulatory beneficiaries (those who benefit from the regulation
of others).144
This Part considers how agencies might respond to disruptive innovation
along these four dimensions. Informal agency “threats” seem, at first glance,
like a nice middle groundallowing agencies to say something early, but in a
malleable and nonbinding way, while preserving maximum flexibility to
gather more information. However, this Article questions the emerging
sentiment that regulators should use “threats” to maintain a flexible stance,
drawing lessons from the FDA’s approach to software and the FCC’s
approach to the Internet. As explained above, the FCC disciplined its threats
with timely enforcement and rulemaking. But the FDA’s strategy
compounded its problems along each dimension: on timing, it was late; on
form, it was casual; on durability, it was transient; and on enforcement, it was
spotty. These cumulative defects have undermined the FDA’s long-term
authority over software and raise serious questions about the prevailing
orthodoxy on regulating new technologies.

144. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL. L. REV. 397, 401–02 (2007).
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TIMING

For regulators confronting disruptive technologies, timing is paramount.
Premature regulation might suffocate new technologies.145 Regulating with
alacrity risks regulating in error.146 Yet, deferring regulation to some future
date forgoes the benefits that would accrue to the public while the
technology is being regulated.147 As the FDA’s posture on software reveals,
initial reticence to regulate can easily harden into a long-term, laissez faire
default. Introductory stances often remain unexamined.
With novel technologies, agencies also risk paralysis by analysis. New
technologies often present unforeseen risks if under-regulated148 and
dramatic opportunity costs if overregulated.149 The inclination of most
regulators is to avoid both extremes. Thus, the timing calculus is highly
variable for new technologies. Agencies understandably agonize over it.
Despite the stakes, legal scholarship is oddly ambivalent about timing.150
Administrative law scholars in particular are far more preoccupied with the
form regulation takes rather than when agencies take it. But the two, no doubt,
are connected. As Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner emphasize, decisions about
the timing of laws can be just as important as decisions about their content.151
David Super argues convincingly that regulatory decisions are often
postponed counterproductively, usually to wait for more information and

145. Wu, supra note 11, at 1849.
146. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 544, 558 (2007). Gervais, in particular, is concerned with regulating in error. Gervais,
supra note 11, at 674.
147. Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 558.
148. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 614–24 (2003) (discussing mounting evidence of
risks associated with the relatively unregulated field of assisted reproductive technology);
Rabin, supra note 35, at 1304–05 (noting that, in the realm of health and safety regulation,
“inaccurate, insufficiently protective, administrative decisions might lead to irreversible longterm risks to society of devastating magnitude”); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz,
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1296–1300 (2006)
(suggesting reasons why regulators might err on the side of under-regulation).
149. Huber, supra note 10, at 1027.
150. Super, supra note 68, at 1379 (arguing that scholarship on timing tends to
“confound the questions of when a decision should be made with who should make it”). A
recent article that does focus sustained attention to timing focuses on legislative timing,
giving only passing thought to administrative agencies. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 146.
Gervais addresses the timing of regulation for new technologies, but relies on the axiom that
“technological change happens faster than social change” to argue that regulation of new
technologies may be premature and fraught with error. Gervais, supra note 11, at 683–84.
151. Gersen & Posner, supra note 146.

202

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:175

preserve maximum flexibility.152 This observation describes the FDA’s
posture towards software. Regulatory flexibility and discretion sound good in
theory. A flexible stance allows regulators to revisit and retreat to earlier
positions if necessary, and tailor their approaches as they learn more. Indeed,
American culture generally values flexibility and condemns inflexibility.153
Our legal culture valorizes executive discretion.154 And legal scholarship in
particular embraces regulatory flexibility, usually as a reaction to the
ossification of agency rulemaking.155
But flexibility often leads to what Super calls “legal procrastination” and
a resulting regulatory inertia.156 Administrative law scholarship generally
assumes that deferring action will necessarily lead agencies to use more
robust, deliberative procedures that will generate more fair and accurate
rules.157 But as the FDA’s policy towards software demonstrates, this
assumption can be wrong. Flexibility and lengthy deliberation are only
worthwhile if they will significantly improve the quality of the agency’s
decision.158 Bureaucratic delay is widely recognized and condemned in
American culture, but its costs to regulatory beneficiaries are infrequently
studied.159
Regulators also tend to overvalue gathering information about new
technologies, which further distorts decisions on regulatory timing. The need
for information has long been a key concern when addressing new risks.160
Wu channels Freidrich Hayek in arguing that traditional regulation is

152. Super, supra note 68, at 1380, 1409.
153. Id. at 1409 (“In social life, calling someone ‘flexible’ is generally a compliment;
inflexibility is characteristic of bullies, dinosaurs, and control freaks.”).
154. Id. at 1409.
155. Id. at 1410 n.148 (citing a string of very recent articles in a range of subjects touting
flexibility); Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1523 (1996).
156. Super, supra note 68, at 1382.
157. Id. at 1398.
158. Id. at 1406.
159. One exception is the literature on delaying environmental regulation. See, e.g., LeaRachel D. Kosnik, Sources of Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of FERC Dam Relicensing, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 258 (2005); Hilary Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and
Interest Group Influence, 44 J.L. & ECON. 315 (2001); Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be
Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 29 (1999).
160. Gervais, supra note 11, at 684–87 (addressing the “unintended consequences” that
generate from early regulatory intervention, even questioning the efficacy of regulatory
requirements like car seatbelts). But see Huber, supra note 10, at 1051–52 (acknowledging the
concern, but questioning its salience).
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“impressive in a world of perfect information, but terrible in this world.”161
However, for regulators, perfect information is often the enemy of good
information.162 Culturally, we are situated firmly in the Information Age, and
thus tend to overvalue information.163 We obsess about gathering all available
information and recoil from making any big decisions without it.164 Legal
culture in particular values information over other inputs into legal decisions,
such as the capacity to implement and enforce laws.165 And the penetration
of economics into legal thought, particularly the well-known market failure of
information asymmetries, further aggravates this overemphasis on gathering
information.166
But more information does not necessarily equate to better information.
Ironically, the more information we gather, the more effort it takes to make a
decision based on it.167 Nor does information itself necessarily make agencies
more efficient long-term. The more the FDA learned about device software,
the more overwhelmed it became. Indeed, the FDA explained that it
withdrew its 1989 Draft Software Policy because of the volume, variety, and
complexity of medical device software.168 In fact, waiting for better
information can be counterproductive. Agency flexibility can be overrated.169
Too much of it can paralyze agencies,170 a notion that might offend our
intuitions about how government should work.
Equally important, early interventions can benefit both regulated industry
and regulatory beneficiaries. As Super demonstrates, “[d]ecisions rarely
become more valuable to society as a whole when rendered later.”171 Indeed,
regulated parties may appreciate the added certainty and reduced cost of
compliance with early regulatory decisions.172 The conventional wisdom that

161. Wu, supra note 11, at 1849 (citing F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945)).
162. Super, supra note 68, at 1380.
163. Id. at 1379.
164. Id. at 1409–10.
165. Id. at 1401 (“We avoid discussing deficiencies in decisional or enforcement capacity
as they embarrass the law . . . .”).
166. Id. at 1401–02.
167. Id. (citing BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 23
(2004) (noting that information overload can paralyze decision making)).
168. 2011 Mobile Medical Applications Draft, supra note 97, at 5.
169. Super, supra note 68, at 1381 (using as case studies the Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005).
170. Id. at 1381.
171. Id. at 1405.
172. Id.
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regulation necessarily stifles innovation does not always hold.173 Indeed, an
industry coalition of app developers and device makers opposed an effort in
Congress to prohibit the FDA from finalizing a draft guidance on mobile
software for eighteen months.174 Industry can benefit from early, clear
regulation.
The obvious exceptions are when the early regulatory intervention is
deeply flawed, or when no intervention is needed, either because the problem
is not severe enough or because it occurs with low frequency.175 But from the
agency’s perspective, early decisions can capitalize on a motivated regulator’s
early passion for and attention to the issue,176 which may wane over time
absent an external shock. Typically, the shock is some tragedy followed by
Congressional intervention forcing the agency to respond.177 And such
reactionary regulation is likely to be more severe and potentially
miscalibrated.178
Early interventions may also benefit from a more objective regulatory
atmosphere, before parties become entrenched and adversarial. In contrast,
deferring action (usually in the name of preserving discretion and gathering
information), often leads to incremental decision making, which is more
susceptible to interest group influence.179 Agencies that precommit to policies
earlier can better avoid bias and capture, emulating (very crudely) a Rawlsian
“veil of ignorance.”180 Although regulated firms generally prefer certainty,
173. This sentiment was echoed during a recent public workshop on FDA regulation of
the latest generation of device software. FDA Public Workshop, supra note 80 (statement of
Dean Kross, M.D.) (citing a decade of experience with unregulated electronic health records
(EHRs) and prescribing software, which produced “ancient, hostile” applications with very
little transparency as to how they operate). Gervais seems particularly wedded to the idea
that there is an inverse correlation between regulation and beneficial innovation. Gervais,
supra note 11, at 668–69.
174. Letter from mHealth Regulatory Coalition to Senators Enzi and Harkin, supra note
82.
175. Super, supra note 68, at 1405–06 (citing Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 593 (1986) (favoring ex post rather than ex ante resolution
with low frequency problems)).
176. Gersen & Posner, supra note 150, at 566.
177. Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of
Medical Products, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 929, 937–49 (2011) (detailing the history of
congressional reactions granting FDA more authority over drugs in the wake of tragedies).
178. See Super, supra note 68, at 1451.
179. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393,
424–25 (1981) (noting that incremental policymaking is susceptible to interest groups and
can sacrifice the agency’s objectivity); Super, supra note 68, at 1418–19.
180. Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 572–73; Super, supra note 68, at 1378 (citing
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–37 (1971)). A “veil of ignorance” generally
“suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of decisionmakers . . . by subjecting the
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and thus should prefer definite rules, current efforts tend to be aimed
primarily at weakening agency oversight.181 Delay may invite obstruction.
Of course, early intervention imposes costs on industry—costs that may
be too heavy for fledgling industries to bear. And regulators should be aware
of legal “transitions” that upset settled expectations.182 The government
should remain sensitive (as it has been under the Obama administration)183 to
imposing new costs on firms.
That said, recent experience with other new technologies illustrates the
consequences of unregulated medical innovation.184 For example, assisted
reproductive technologies (“ART”) like artificial embryo implantation
proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s without any real FDA oversight, and
despite the lack of clinical evidence that these interventions were safe and
effective.185 In the meantime, unproven reproductive technologies gave rise
to a significant industry, and “questions quickly arose about the accuracy of
promotional claims.”186 Arguably, neither tort law, state oversight, nor
professional self-regulation filled in.187 A similar story describes the explosive
growth of the dietary supplement industry, which also advanced with very

decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result
from the decision.” Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE
L.J. 399, 399 (2001).
181. Super, supra note 68, at 1428.
182. Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 128 (2003);
Huber, supra note 10, at 1064 (noting that “transition costs are largely absent when new
products are regulated”); Kaplow, supra note 175.
183. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76
Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011) (calling for federal agencies to identify ways to achieve
regulatory goals “that are designed to promote innovation,” promote regulatory flexibility,
and reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens).
184. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 148.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 614.
187. Id. at 648. Eventually, the FDA asserted jurisdiction over some ART technologies
by proposing rules, and sent warning letters with notices of violations. See Current Good
Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1508 (2001); Establishment Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,744 (1998); Noah, supra note 148, at
650–51. It is also contested whether tort law and self-regulation by the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) did indeed fill the regulatory void. See, e.g., Kimberly M.
Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access to Cross Border Fertility Care in the United
States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 361–62 (2012) (discussing the United States’ “not
completely deserved reputation as the Wild West of fertility treatment”).
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little meaningful oversight188 and with very little evidence to support its
claims.189 As noted, waiting does not necessarily generate superior regulation.
B.

FORM

A parallel decision for regulators confronting new technologies is form.
Agencies are unique among government institutions in having several choices
of policymaking form.190 For years, scholars have debated whether agencies
should make policy ex ante via rulemaking or ex post via adjudication.191 The
debate used to weigh these two primary modes, until rulemaking began to
predominate in the 1970s.192 By the early 1990s, the debate had shifted to
rulemaking versus guidance, just as agencies began to rely on guidances even
more than rules.193
Like most agencies, the FDA is statutorily authorized to choose among
these forms.194 Agencies enjoy significant discretion, as this choice is virtually
immune from judicial review.195 This Section evaluates the three primary
forms of policymaking (rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance), as well as
newer forms, and whether these forms matter when confronting new
188. The lack of oversight of dietary supplements was not due to the FDA dragging its
feet, but to Congress tying the FDA’s hands. See Symposium: The Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act: Regulation at a Crossroads, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 147–364 (2005) (providing a
comprehensive overview of how Congress prevented FDA action).
189. There have been many takedowns of the dietary supplement industry. For a recent
survey of evidence (especially the lack thereof), see PAUL A. OFFIT, DO YOU BELIEVE IN
MAGIC? THE SENSE AND NONSENSE OF ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (2013) (finding that only
four of the 51,000 supplements on the U.S. market are supported by valid scientific
evidence).
190. Magill, supra note 55.
191. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 562–63 (1992) (wrestling with whether decision making via enforcement and
adjudication are more efficient than rulemaking ex ante); Magill, supra note 55, at 1403 n.69
(citing two decades of literature on the subject); Super, supra note 68, at 1411–12.
192. Magill, supra note 55, at 1398–99 (noting that after Congress passed the APA in
1946, most agencies carried out their statutory obligations by adjudication in the 1950s and
1960s, shifting decidedly towards broad-based rulemaking in the 1970s).
193. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 398 (noting that the volume of guidances is
“massive” compared to rules). Aware of this trend and suspicious of abuse, the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held hearings and issued a report in
2000. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009 (2000). In response, the EPA revealed that it had issued
over 2000 guidances between 1996 and 1999, and OSHA revealed over 3,000 during the
same period. In comparison, the EPA issued only 100 “significant” rules and OSHA twenty
during that same period. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 399.
194. Magill, supra note 55, at 1388 n.11 (citing, for example, 21 U.S.C. §§ 334, 371(a)
(2000)).
195. Id. at 1405–42 (discussing the germinal case, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947)).
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technologies. I argue that, in retrospect, the FDA’s reliance on guidance
weakened its oversight of software, and that it now risks repeating its mistake
with the next generation of software.
1. Rulemaking
The FDA could have proceeded by rule. The benefits of rules are
many,196 although enthusiasm for them long ago waned. Rules can set clear,
authoritative, and durable requirements. The rulemaking process uses robust,
transparent procedures that accommodate broad public participation.197 The
rulemaking process is designed to ventilate issues of broad public concern
and is particularly suitable when the problem is widespread and
foreseeable.198 As such, rulemaking can be more efficient than making policy
via individualized adjudication, as federal agencies discovered in the 1960s
and 1970s.199 Rules are widely published and are more easily accessible than
adjudications, although this advantage is slighter in an era of agency
websites.200 Rules are also subject to more oversight by politically accountable
institutions, like Congress and the President. But above all, rules bind.
Agencies can enforce them. This was the chief limitation of the FDA’s
reliance on guidance.
Of course, the disadvantages of rulemaking are also abundant, as well
canvassed by scholars. The most familiar is that promulgating rules requires a
long, lumbering process201—one that is almost universally condemned as
being ossified and prolonged by cumulative procedural burdens,202 including
executive review and various statutory hurdles.203 Studies confirm this
196. See generally Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice
of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 122–36 (1990) (discussing the benefits of
rulemaking vis-à-vis adjudication).
197. Rulemaking by federal agencies is governed by § 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
198. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292–94 (1974) (discussing when a
legislative rule would be appropriate in reviewing agency choices for an abuse of discretion);
cf. Magill, supra note 55, at 1408.
199. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 376 (1978).
200. Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, supra note 60, at
1374.
201. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
202. Magill, supra note 55, at 1390–91, 1391 n.17 (citing the “large literature on the
‘ossification’ of the rulemaking process”). Mark Seidenfeld once counted 109 discrete
rulemaking requirements. Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative
Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533 (2000).
203. There are well-known executive burdens that apply to most rulemaking, the most
recognized being review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in
the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, Federal
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critique, finding that rulemaking at some agencies can take upwards of two
years to complete.204 At the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”), for example, the average duration of rulemaking without a
statutorily imposed deadline was a staggering 817 days.205
Rules are also critiqued for being inflexible. They are hard to update, as
doing so requires another round of notice and comment.206 Rules also can be
overinclusive or underinclusive, and thus unjust.207 And like statutes, rules are
prospective, so they must be general enough to accommodate unforeseen
conduct.208 These factors undoubtedly weigh on agency decisions to forgo
rulemaking.
2. Adjudication
The FDA also could have established policy via adjudication, which has
its own pros and cons. Among the pros, adjudication allows agencies to
address problems in discrete, concrete circumstances, rather than
prospectively and abstractly, as with rulemaking.209 Agencies can use
Regulation, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 3
C.F.R. 638, 638, 642, 644 (1994) (§ 4 “Planning Mechanism” and § 6 “Centralized Review of
Regulations”). And as many authors observe, there are lesser-known rulemaking
requirements imposed by statute. Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the
Food and Drug Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 17, 19 (2005) (“In addition to the APA, there are a number of laws that impact
the development of rules . . . . [A] variety of Executive Orders . . . also apply.”); Connor N.
Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782,
788, 788 n.16 (2010) (“Agencies must also complete a number of lesser-known procedural
requirements before issuing a legislative rule.”); e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71, 1532–35 (2012); Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012);
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012); Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (2012); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3549 (2012); Small
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(c), 3506(i), 3520 (2012).
204. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 923, 988 tbl.12 (2008) (studying the period between 1988 and 2003, and noting
rulemaking actions without congressionally imposed deadlines).
205. Id.
206. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 410.
207. Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 440–41 (1999); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in
the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446 (2003) (noting that centralized,
command-and-control regulation “suffers from the inherent problems involved in
attempting to dictate the conduct of millions of actors in a quickly changing and very
complex economy and society throughout a large and diverse nation.”); see also Mendelson,
supra note 144, at 438.
208. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 410.
209. Bonfield, supra note 196, at 122–36.
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adjudication to respond quickly to problematic conduct as it arises.210
Adjudication also allows agencies to create policy incrementally, in the
absence of consensus.211 Another benefit is that agencies can also target
egregious, outlier conduct that does not occur often enough to require
broad-based rulemaking.212 And if the conduct of individual firms differs in
key ways, adjudication can account for that.213
But like rulemaking, adjudication has well-known deficiencies.
Adjudication does not invite broad public participation, so it can be awkward
for establishing broader policies.214 Agencies can choose sympathetic targets
for adjudication, whose conduct may not fairly represent industry practices.215
Any precedents established in adjudication can be limited by facts peculiar to
the case.216 Moreover, precedents technically bind only the parties.217 Thus,
agencies pushing new legal theories or interpretations face problems with fair
notice, and may find it difficult to enforce the new position.218 Formal
administrative adjudications resemble judicial trials, with all their
inefficiencies.219 And agencies wishing to enforce their adjudications in court
must convince the Department of Justice to take up their cause.220
Adjudication may also be inefficient vis-à-vis rulemaking when the agency
has to relitigate the issue repeatedly.
Yet the familiar dichotomy between rulemaking and adjudication can be a
false one. The two must coexist if agencies wish to enforce rules and clarify
them in individualized applications.221 Rules can be toothless without
enforcement, and enforcement requires something to enforce. Guidances can
depart from this symbiosis.
3. Guidances
When the FDA first announced a software policy in 1987, it chose to
make policy via guidance—a pattern it continues today. For agencies, the
major attraction of guidances is that guidances need not comply with the
210. Magill, supra note 55, at 1396–97.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1444–45.
214. Magill, supra note 55, at 1396.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 436.
219. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2012) (including the APA’s procedures for formal
adjudication and rulemaking); Magill, supra note 55, at 1391.
220. Magill, supra note 55, at 1391, 1393.
221. Bonfield, supra note 196, at 122–36.
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notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures required by the APA222 or any
other statute.223 Publishing guidances is quicker than even most forms of
adjudication.224 Compared to rulemaking, guidances are a very economical
way to signal agency preferences.225 They give agencies greater flexibility to
update or retreat from the policy when necessary.226 Guidances are useful for
coordinating lower level agency personnel.227 Agencies may also prefer
guidances because they are virtually immune from pre-enforcement judicial
review and are subject to less congressional oversight.228 Finally, guidances
are generally credible,229 and they can be “sticky” like regulations.230
Agencies are known to use guidances to clarify highly technical or
scientific requirements that would be difficult to update via rulemaking or

222. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). In the early 1980s, Congress considered bills that would have
required agencies to use notice-and-comment procedures for many guidances, but none of
these bills passed. See H.R. 2327, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 220, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 1080,
97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 746, 97th Cong. (1981); Mendelson, supra note 144, at 401 & n.25.
223. Note, however, that even the guidance document process is becoming burdened by
procedure. In 2007, the Bush administration published Executive Order 13,422, which
allows the OMB to require agencies to consult with it before issuing a “significant” guidance
document, defined as one that has an economic impact of more than $100 million in any
single year, or raises important legal issues (among other criteria). Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3
C.F.R. 191–92 (2007) (rescinded by President Obama’s Exec. Order. No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R.
218 (2013)).
224. See Magill, supra note 55, at 1391–92 (describing developing guidances as “relatively
cheap[]” for agencies in comparison to adjudication and formal rulemaking).
225. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381,
404–08 (1985) (arguing that agencies rely on guidance documents when budgetary pressures
require it); Mendelson, supra note 144, at 408. In the words of one FDA official, “In an ideal
world, we would always do rulemaking, but it is not as responsive and there is a lot of
process involved, not only internal to the agency, but outside FDA.” Seiguer & Smith, supra
note 203, at 24. Another FDA official said, “To do a rule, it’s a huge ordeal . . . there are
economic analyses of the impact, notice and comment, involvement of the OMB, etc.” Id.;
see also Gersen & Posner, supra note 59, at 588–89, 594–95 (describing the similar allure of
soft law statutes by Congress).
226. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 408.
227. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for
an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001).
228. Magill, supra note 55, at 1395; Mendelson, supra note 144, at 408.
229. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 59, at 589 (noting that soft law can be credible
even when it is not costly to speak).
230. The rulemaking process has been criticized as being inefficient and “sticky.” See,
e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3
(1997); Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 819, 822 (2008) (book review) (discussing the “stickiness of the rulemaking process”).
But stickiness may be good, if the agency wants the guidance to endure.
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adjudication.231 These issues may require “a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.”232
Indeed, there is almost a consensus in the literature that guidances are more
appropriate than rulemaking to address rapid technological and scientific
advancement, as Wu argues.233 In a recent study, representatives from both
the FDA and regulated industry agreed on this use of guidances.234
But for all the glowing evaluations, relying on guidance does pose
problems. Many scholars suspect that agencies abuse guidance as a way to
skirt procedure,235 though a recent study disputes this.236 Agency
consideration may not be disciplined the same way as when subject to the
procedures governing rulemaking and adjudication237—although in FDA’s
case its consideration is tempered by its Good Guidance Practices, and for
most agencies by executive review protocols.238 Guidances are hailed for their
flexibility, yet one study found that they are updated with even less frequency
than rules.239 And if agencies use guidances to address scientific and technical
issues, they might be doing so at the expense of public input.
The major shortcoming is that guidance is not enforceable. Agencies
cannot allege violations of guidance documents or initiate enforcement
actions based solely on them.240 Defenders of guidance tend to emphasize its
231. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 545–56 (2003); Raso, supra note 203, at 815
(citing as examples the Department of Transportation, EPA, and OSHA).
232. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 277
(2008).
233. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1842, 1848–54.
234. See, e.g., Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 23. Seiguer and Smith interviewed
several representatives from the FDA and industry, and found that “[t]hose interviewed
agreed that due to the rapid pace of scientific advancement, guidances . . . provide the best
means of providing information to assist industry in understanding and complying with
regulatory requirements.” In fact, they noted that a common theme among interviewees was
“[t]he importance of guidances in an era of complex science.” Id.
235. Raso, supra note 203, at 785–87.
236. Id. at 809–23 (reviewing five agencies (EPA, FCC, FDA, IRS, and OSHA) over ten
years (1996–2006) and finding that agencies generally do not use guidance documents to
avoid rulemaking, at least for “significant” policies). Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner discuss
some of the same “rule of law” objections to soft law by Congress. Gersen & Posner, supra
note 59, at 597–98. Others have proposed procedural reforms to legitimate guidances. See,
e.g., Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343 (2009).
237. Magill, supra note 55, at 1397, 1446.
238. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2012); FDA Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115
(2013).
239. Raso, supra note 203, at 818–19 (noting, however, the limitations of the available
data).
240. William Funk, When is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative
Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 661–62 (2002); Magill, supra note 55, at
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benefits to industry without contemplating how it can disadvantage
regulatory beneficiaries.241 Even an open, transparent guidance process like
the FDA’s can skew heavily towards industry, per Nina Mendelson’s critique
that agencies generally solicit comments on guidance from industry, but not
from regulatory beneficiaries.242
Notwithstanding these criticisms, most scholars agree that some guidance
is better than none.243 But it is far from clear that doing nothing is the only
counterfactual, or that guidance is always preferable to rulemaking,
particularly when enforcement matters.244 Agencies like the FDA still choose
to promulgate rules when they desire enforceability.245
In many ways, the FDA’s reliance on guidance is notable. The FDA is a
serial user, dating back to 1902, when its precursor first used them.246 Today,
the FDA issues roughly twice as many guidances as it does rules,247 and the
ratio has increased steadily since the 1970s.248 By the 1990s, the FDA was
generating proportionally fewer regulations and more guidances, such that
guidances became the agency’s primary mode of policymaking.249 By the late
1394; Mendelson, supra note 144, at 406–07, 410. Indeed, courts have prohibited agencies
from trying to bind regulated firms via guidance documents. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co.
v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d
1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
241. See generally Mendelson, supra note 144, at 402, 413–14 (noting that commentators
tend to defend guidances by arguing that they are better than nothing at signaling regulators’
intent and help keep the conduct of agencies’ employees consistent).
242. Id. at 427–29 (noting the general tendency of agencies to “float” draft guidances to
industry contacts and solicit comments from them but not the public, and describing the
FAA’s quite disturbing practice of accepting comments on guidance documents only from a
list of seventeen industry organizations, which does not include passenger or consumer
safety groups).
243. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 647 (2002); Asimow, supra note 225, at 381; Mendelson, supra note 144,
at 413.
244. Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 28.
245. Id.
246. K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 509 (2011).
247. Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 25–26 (finding that during 2001, 2002, and most
of 2003, the FDA issued well more than twice as many guidances (298) as rules (129)).
248. Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 168 (2000) (noting the marked increase in the ratio of
guidance documents to rules from the 1970s through the 1990s).
249. Lewis, supra note 246, at 520. In fact, the FDA center responsible for regulating
medical devices, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (“CDRH”), has relied far
more on guidances than other centers in the agency. Between 1975 and 2009, CDRH
published 659 guidances, compared to 507 by the drug center (“CDER”), 294 by the
biologics center (“CBER”), and 190 by the food center (“CFSCAN”). Id. at 549–50 fig.5.
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1990s, observers were already wondering whether rulemaking at the FDA
had become an artifact from earlier ages.250
The FDA is also notable for being the only agency whose guidance
practices are governed by statute and regulation.251 The FDA initially
proposed its own “Good Guidance Practices” by regulation in 1992.252
Congress then codified the regulation by statute in 1997.253 Together the two
documents require the FDA to solicit public input and use notice-andcomment-like procedures when creating guidances.254 Importantly, the statute
requires that FDA staff generally follow the agency’s own guidances.255
Yet, at the end of the day, even FDA guidances cannot bind as a matter
of law256 (though some report that individual FDA staff sometimes say
otherwise).257 When push comes to shove in court, the FDA must point to
statutes and regulations, not guidance. Any paths blazed via guidance remain
legally quarantined until the agency takes action to “codify” them.
4. New Forms?
We are undoubtedly in a new era of policymaking pluralism, so the menu
for agencies like the FDA is more varied. The traditional substrata of
rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance now support variations like
negotiated rulemaking, waiver systems, and other more flexible, collaborative
forms that are often called regulatory “experimentalism” or “new
governance.”258 Agencies that struggle with limited, stagnant resources are
250. John C. Carey, Is Rulemaking Old Medicine at the FDA?, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW:
AN ELECTRONIC BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS 3–6 (Peter Barton Hutt ed., 2012), http://
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hutt/book_index.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2013).
251. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2012); FDA Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115
(2013).
252. 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314 (Oct. 15, 1992). The FDA finalized its Good Guidance
Practices in 1997. 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997).
253. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 405, 111
Stat. 2296, 2368–69 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371(h)); see also Lars Noah, FDA’s New Policy on
Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating it Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113 (1997) (discussing the
FDA’s good guidance practices).
254. 21 U.S.C. § 371(h); 21 C.F.R. § 10.115; see also 65 Fed. Reg. 56,468, 56,473 (Sept. 19,
2000) (addressing public concerns regarding the respective roles of guidances versus noticeand-comment rulemaking); id. at 56,477–78 (describing comment procedures under 21
C.F.R. § 10.115 resembling the notice-and-comment procedures involved in rulemaking
under the APA). Some doubt that public comments on guidance documents mean much to
the FDA. Seiguer and Smith, supra note 203, at 30.
255. 21 U.S.C. § 371(h).
256. 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(h)(1)(A), (h)(2).
257. Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 30.
258. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Freeman, supra note 230; Magill, supra note 55, at 1398–99;
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increasingly looking to alternatives.259 The recent scholarly trend is to
champion nimble agencies that practice regulatory experimentalism in
response to changing circumstances.260 Even the hoary FDA drug approval
process promises to benefit from experimentalism, argue proponents of new
governance like Charles Sabel and Bill Simon.261
Although the FDA did not explicitly choose an experimental method
with software, one cannot help but sense from the agency a collaborative
mood in some of its public hearings (during which FDA comments were
more than solicitous of industry and, somewhat asymmetrically, the industry
was not shy about voicing displeasure with the FDA’s approach).262 This
highlights how regulatory experimentalism can take for granted the
“adversarial legalism” of our regulatory system—our tendency to formally
contest policymaking.263 Regardless of the form policymaking takes, industry
will find ways to contest it.
5. Does Form Matter?
It is possible that the differences among policymaking forms are
overstated. For example, as Nina Mendelson notes, guidances frequently

David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006). Sabel and Simon, in fact, point to
quality regulation of food manufacturing as a paragon of regulatory experimentalism. Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100
GEO. L.J. 53, 55, 78 (2011). The Food Safety and Modernization Act of 2010 requires the
FDA to require processors to use a flexible, customizable cycle of hazard detection and
corrective and preventative actions. The process is familiarly known in FDA circles as
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (“HACCP”), but was relabeled in the 2010
legislation as Hazard Analysis and Preventive Controls. FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 103, 201, 307, 124 Stat. 3885, 3889–90, 3923, 3962
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
259. See Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, supra note 39, at 557 n.106 (quoting
former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky).
260. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 258, at 56, 78 (“Experimentalism takes its name
from John Dewey’s political philosophy, which aims to precisely accommodate the
continuous change and variation that we see as the most pervasive challenge of current
public problems.”).
261. Id. at 87–88 (discussing variations on the binary approve/reject decision for FDA
reviewers of new drug approvals (“NDAs”)).
262. See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 80 (containing transcripts and webcasts of the
proceedings).
263. See Solomon, supra note 230, at 821, 847–51 (reviewing two examples of how
scholars are rethinking the U.S. regulatory state and concluding that both pay inadequate
attention to the “adversarial legalism” described by Robert Kagan). See generally ROBERT A.
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). Interestingly,
moving beyond adversarial legalism would probably require agencies to have more
discretion, more finality, and less legal friction. Solomon, supra note 230, at 848.
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resemble rules, which is why they are often called “nonlegislative rules.”264
Indeed, courts review whether agencies treat nonlegislative rules as having
the force of law.265 Scholars have long recognized that finding meaningful
doctrinal distinctions between legislative and nonlegislative rules is a task
“enshrouded in considerable smog.”266
Moreover, regulated parties may not appreciate the limited legal status of
guidances,267 as they generally comply with them anyway.268 Most observers
note that industries choose to treat guidances as binding for practical
purposes,269 even after Congress pressured agencies to more clearly label their
guidances as such and disclaim any legally binding effect.270 The FTC even
declares (in the Code of Federal Regulations, no less) that it may initiate
enforcement actions against parties that do not comply with its guidances.271

264. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 399.
265. See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
266. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut,
120 YALE L.J. 276, 286–87 (2010) (citing both courts and scholars that have struggled with
the distinction).
267. In fairness to regulated industry, the legal status of FDA guidance documents has
always been confusing. For example, in 1977, the FDA promulgated a regulation binding
itself with officially published advisory opinions and guidelines. 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708–10
(1977). Although this stance was ostensibly superseded by the agency’s Good Guidance
Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (declaring that guidances are nonbinding at § 10.115(i)(i),
(i)(iv)), there remains some confusion. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 246.
268. Mendelson argues that regulated parties comply with guidance documents rather
than bear the expense, uncertainty, and acrimony of challenging them in court. Mendelson,
supra note 144, at 407–08. This does not address guidance documents that are un- or underenforced by the agency, which parties would have little incentive to challenge as they age and
become stale. Nevertheless, Seiguer and Smith found that “in practice, most of those
interviewed [from the FDA and regulated industries] said that industry treats guidances no
differently than rules.” Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 29–30 (noting that this response
reflected “the majority of those interviewed,” and emphasizing that “industry is loathe to
diverge from the agency’s current thinking embodied in the guidance”).
269. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 407–08; Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 29–30.
270. See COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 8–9 (2000); Mendelson, supra note
144, at 400 & n.17 (noting that the Committee’s critiques “probably led the agencies to add
disclaimers more systematically”).
271. Of course, the FTC is careful to note that such enforcement would rely on
statutory violations. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2013) (“Failure to comply with the guides may result in
corrective action by the Commission under applicable statutory provisions. Guides may
relate to a practice common to many industries or to specific practices of a particular
industry.”).
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As with rules, the APA requires agencies to publish most guidance
documents in the Federal Register or in some other accessible source.272
Sometimes Congress even requires agencies by statute to publish
guidances.273 As a result, many agencies, particularly the FDA, find
themselves dedicating substantial time and resources to guidances.274
As Elizabeth Magill suggests, we might be more concerned with the
outcome of agency action than “the package in which it is wrapped.”275 But
Magill also notes that policymaking form dictates important things like its
scope, the parties’ procedural rights, enforceability, and judicial review.276
Moreover, the intuition that guidances give industry timely notice of new
requirements while rulemaking does not is probably overwrought. Draft
guidances are sometimes never finalized and agencies propose rules far
before they are finalized.277 The regulatory uncertainty argument thus rings
hollow as to form. In fact, both the FDA and industry representatives
observed that the agency often takes a long time to articulate a concrete
position on new issues, regardless of whether it chooses rulemaking or
guidance.278 The FDA’s draft guidances are known to linger for years before
being finalized.279 Many morph into de facto final guidances,280 as the 1989
Draft Software Policy did.
Finally, differences in form may be overstated because they are not
mutually exclusive. The reality is that “[m]any agencies regularly employ a
mix of policymaking tools on a given issue—sometimes promulgating or
amending a rule, sometimes bringing an enforcement action, and sometimes
issuing a guidance document.”281 Threats can start informally before
272. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2012) (requiring publication of interpretive rules and
policy statements in the Federal Register); § 552(a)(2)(b) (requiring public accessibility of
important guidance documents that are not in the Federal Register).
273. See, e.g., Raso, supra note 203, at 814 n.144 (citing the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 § 212, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012), which requires agencies to
issue compliance guides for small businesses on important rules).
274. See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 24 (quoting an anonymous interviewee as
stating, “Ideally, [guidances] should be faster and more flexible, but in practice, they may
take as long as rules to develop.”).
275. Magill, supra note 55, at 1419 (explaining why courts might be reluctant to review
the vehicles agencies choose to use for policymaking, ultimately deciding that form does
matter).
276. Id. at 1420.
277. A recent commentary finds that, on balance, guidances benefit regulated industry,
generalizing this point on regulatory certainty. See Lewis, supra note 246, at 541.
278. See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 31.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. Magill, supra note 55, at 1410.
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percolating into adjudication. For example, the FDA issues frequent
“warning letters” to alleged regulatory violators. Warning letters are informal
and are not considered official enforcement action.282 But the industry treats
FDA warning letters as precedent, and lawyers advise clients based on them.
The FDA’s warning letters all cite specific statutory or regulatory violations,
which then form the basis of any subsequent judicial enforcement.
In the end, the choice of policymaking form may not be as stark as it
once was. And one form does not preclude another. But the FDA’s decision
to address software by guidance, to the exclusion of rulemaking, necessarily
weakened its enforcement posture.
C.

DURABILITY

The third question for agencies confronting disruptive innovation is how
durable to make their policies. A concern with rulemaking is that it might be
too durable for evolving technologies, hence the intuitive appeal of informal
“threats.” Agencies can temper concerns over the timing and form of
policies by manipulating how long the policy will endure.
Of course, a policy’s durability will be dictated in large part by its form.283
For example, we might be particularly concerned about the durability of
guidances given the transience of agency leadership. Political appointees, who
often set regulatory priorities, spend an average of only eighteen to twentyfour months with their agencies.284 Transient appointees, not to mention
transient administrations, can undermine agency guidances by not adhering
to them or by simply deprioritizing them. Although rules are also subject to
amendment and rescission, they tend to be more resilient.285
The trick is to craft enduring policy under high uncertainty.286 Even large
federal bureaucracies like the FDA cannot make perfectly calibrated
decisions about new products or conduct.287 So-called “timing rules,”
contemplated by Gersen and Posner in the legislative context,288 might help.

282. The FDA includes “warning letters” in its definition of informal enforcement
actions. 21 C.F.R. § 100.2(j)(1) (2013).
283. See Raso, supra note 203, at 803.
284. Id. at 803 (citing Paul C. Light, Our Tottering Confirmation Process, BROOKINGS (Spring
2002), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_governance_light.aspx).
285. Id.
286. See generally Fried, supra note 182, at 146–51 (discussing economic and empirical
literature of decision making under uncertainty, weighing ex ante versus ex post decision
making).
287. See Wu, supra note 11.
288. See generally Gersen & Posner, supra note 146.
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Like legislators, regulators can manipulate the timing and duration of
their interventions.289 Options include mandatory deadlines, waiting periods,
interim periods, phases, and sunsets.290 These can control the timing of how
laws are considered, enacted, and implemented, with the purpose of
achieving some optimum result in the public interest.291 For example,
agencies frequently use interim final rules to impose new requirements
immediately while extending public comment on them. Such tools can be
most useful when operating under uncertainty, as they allow lawmakers to
“economize on legislative costs, address problems quickly or enable citizens
to adjust, and handle uncertainty about the effects of a legislative
proposal.”292 The more inchoate the technology, the less “durable” the
regulator might want its policy to be.293
Here, two particularly promising possibilities are sunsets and deadlines.
Other possibilities include deferred or conditional rulemaking,294 although
these might only encourage further delay.295
1. Sunsets
Regulators can ease their anxiety over regulating new technologies
prematurely or incorrectly by using sunsets—regulating temporarily.
Congress frequently uses sunset clauses and other forms of temporary
legislation that specify a finite duration.296 Sunsets are useful when the
benefits of intervening are uncertain, as they reduce the costs of errors and
allow regulators to gather better information.297 They can also counterbalance
289. See id. at 545 (defining a “timing rule” as “a rule that substantially affects the timing
of government action, including legislation and executive action,” and typically includes
deadlines and mandatory delays).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 546.
292. Id. at 563.
293. See Gervais, supra note 11, at 701.
294. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 562 (describing deferred and conditional
legislation).
295. Gersen and Posner detail, somewhat optimistically, four benefits of delay rules for
administrative agencies: (i) they allow agencies to gather more information, (ii) they “might
reduce the effect of deliberative pathologies” like polarization over an issue, (iii) they might
allow agency executives to better oversee major initiatives, and (iv) they could mitigate
interest group incentives to weaken the rule. Id. at 588. These benefits are suspect, as noted
above.
296. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 250 (2007)
(refuting “the notion that temporary legislation is a new, peculiar, or particularly suspect
legislative tool”); Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 562 n.78 (noting that sunset clauses
date back to the First Congress).
297. See Gersen, Temporary Legislation, supra note 296, at 248, 266–78 (noting that “when
initial decisions are likely to be wrong, staged decision procedures facilitate the correction of
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cognitive biases in assessing uncertainty and overreacting to new risks.298
Sunset clauses proliferated among states during the regulatory reform
movement of the 1970s and 1980s, on the theory that they would encourage
more legislative oversight and thus make agencies more efficient and more
responsive.299
Despite their deregulatory roots, sunset clauses might be useful for
addressing disruptive innovation. Temporary regulation would allow agencies
like the FDA to impose some standards as the technology gestates and the
agency learns more about it. Sunset regulation would impose binding,
enforceable requirements in the meantime. As such, it could serve as a
stopgap,300 allowing us to capture the public benefits that we would otherwise
forego by deferring regulation entirely.
Sunsets certainly are not a panacea. Like other variations on the
regulatory process, they are susceptible to strategic behavior301 and, as
emphasized above, the wait for more information is not always worthwhile.
But sunsets decrease the costs of premature or incorrect regulation by timelimiting the damage they can inflict. Moreover, the argument that temporary
regulation would generate too much uncertainty for industry is tempered by
the reality that sunset laws can always be reauthorized or extended, and that
“permanent” regulation can always be amended or repealed.302 Finally,
wrapping the temporary policy in a regulation rather than a guidance would
make it more durable.303 Had the FDA taken this approach with software, it
could have provided a much-needed regulatory backbone—one that would
be enforceable but also amenable to occasional updates as computing
advanced.

errors, and this is particularly likely to be the case in policy contexts dominated by
uncertainty”).
298. See id. at 269–72 (noting that “new policy initiatives are often enacted in the
immediate aftermath of realized or recognized risks” and that “staged decision procedures
are utilized as compensation mechanisms for conditions of uncertainty in many other fields,”
citing examples).
299. Id. at 259–60.
300. See id. at 273–74.
301. See id. at 275; LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 203–06 (2011) (critiquing sunset legislation in the tax
code).
302. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, supra note 296, at 261.
303. Gersen addresses durability in light of public choice theory and the political
calculations it can generate. See id. at 279–86.
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2. Deadlines
To address the concern that an agency’s initial restraint will calcify into a
long-term laissez faire posture, Congress might set a regulatory deadline for
the agency. Congress frequently does.304
The scant scholarship scrutinizing regulatory deadlines suggests that they
have both advantages and limitations, particularly on the procedures agencies
use, the extent of public participation, and the duration of the agency’s
action.305 Their most obvious advantage is to confront persistent agency
delay.306 Deadlines can be desirable when “it is more important that a rule
exist than it be right.”307 Congress has imposed deadlines on numerous
agencies, particularly the EPA.308 The most familiar FDA examples are the
various statutory deadlines for approving new drug approval applications
(“NDAs”),309 which demonstrate the dynamics between the agency and the
pharmaceutical industry.310
Congressional deadlines can counterbalance barriers to challenging
agency delay or inaction.311 Jacob Gersen and Anne O’Connell found that
although deadlines speed up agency action only modestly, the impact on
HHS rulemaking is remarkable, reducing the average length by more than
forty percent (from 817 days to 445 days).312 Procedurally, deadlines tend to
correlate with interim final rules, which legally bind while the agency gathers
public comments.313 Deadlines also correlate with more comment periods,

304. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 545; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 204.
305. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 204, at 942–49.
306. Id. at 927.
307. Id. at 971 (noting that such cases can be rare).
308. Id. at 939, 981 tbl.2 (tallying 611 statutory deadlines for the EPA and 940 for the
Department of Commerce).
309. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491
(1992) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
310. Daniel P. Carpenter, Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval,
46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (2002). Of course, the power dynamic is complicated by the (now
quite hefty) user fees required by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) and its
reauthorizations. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(c)(4) (2012); FDA, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates
for Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,639, 45,642 (Aug. 1, 2012) (setting the fee for filing a
New Drug Approval (“NDA”) application at $1,958,000 for fiscal year 2013).
311. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 204, at 927–28, 951–54 (noting that deadlines
sometimes “provide a rare opportunity for parties to successfully sue for agency inaction
under section 706(1) of the APA”).
312. Id. at 945–46, 988 tbl.12. Gersen and O’Connell gathered data between April 1988
to October 2003 from agency reports in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
Actions, published semiannually in the Federal Register. Id. at 938 n.57.
313. Id. at 943–44.
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probably because Congress tends to use deadlines for more significant
actions.314
On the downside, deadlines can exacerbate the cognitive bias to
overestimate newer, higher-profile risks over older, established ones.315 Yet,
in the case of medical device software, the newer risks demonstrated by
mobile technologies highlight longstanding risks with software that the FDA
historically under-regulates.316
Another downside is that deadlines might prompt industry efforts to
defeat or weaken the regulation preemptively. Again, this concern is not
overwhelming, as agencies already publish Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
(“NPRM”) and even Advanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
(“ANPRM”) that forecast their interventions.317 Interim final rules also serve
this purpose by binding the public (hence the “final”), but only for a limited
time (hence the “interim”).318
In short, agencies can manipulate the durability of their policies. The
FDA’s 1989 software policy was not durable enough, and in fact, it did not
endure.
D.

ENFORCEMENT

Once an agency has settled on when and how to regulate a new
technology, it must decide how rigorously to enforce its policy. Executive
agencies have unmistakable discretion here.319 Indeed, agency discretion may
reach its apex versus judicial interference in matters of enforcement.320 As a
practical matter, agency discretion is limited only by political and resource
constraints.
314. Id. at 943.
315. Id. at 974.
316. Cortez, supra note 78 (detailing some of the risks of mobile health technologies and
how these echo some of the early concerns with primitive device software).
317. For a discussion of why agencies sometimes use ANPRM, see Barbara H. Brandon
& Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1465–68 (2002); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1986)
(criticizing the use of ANPRM as defensive and dilatory). For a discussion of the dynamics
of NPRM, see Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 587.
318. See Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110–12 (Aug. 18,
1995) (discussing interim final rulemaking by several agencies and endorsing its use in certain
circumstances); Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV.
703 (1999); Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 587.
319. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828–35 (1985); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial
Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004).
320. See Bressman, supra note 319, at 1705–10 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004)).
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But enforcement discretion still demands fidelity to the agency’s statutory
responsibilities, and, above all, to the public interest. Agencies may be
perfectly justified in tempering early enforcement against new technologies.
Yet, as the innovation matures and as its risks become more evident, these
initial justifications can become threadbare, as demonstrated by the FDA’s
history with software.
This argument counters several deeply rooted cultural norms about
government regulation and technology. The overzealous regulator has long
been an archetype in American political discourse. The idea that federal
agencies systematically over-regulate is an old one, reaching a crescendo
during the Reagan era,321 with a renewed vigor today. But, as Nicholas Bagley
and Richard Revesz argue, this idea is generally wrong.322 Still, the intuition
endures. In fact, efforts to reform federal regulation often do so primarily
with regulated industry in mind, rather than regulatory beneficiaries.323 Some
even argue that new technologies will generally regulate themselves.324
It is hard not to notice the cognitive dissonance here. There is
widespread recognition that compliance with regulations is spotty,325 and that
agencies generally lack the resources and personnel to enforce the law
optimally.326 Scholars have examined regulatory underenforcement in a
number of contexts.327 Recent studies show that even when agencies do make
321. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263–66 (2006); McGarity, supra note 155, at 1484–91, 1491–98
(describing the arguments of those advocating for less (or no) regulation).
322. See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 321 (strongly refuting the claim of rampant
overregulation and arguing that agencies routinely under-regulate).
323. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 429–31 (suggesting that, for a number of reasons,
informal rulemaking and reform tend to disenfranchise beneficiaries); McGarity, supra note
155, at 1467, 1476–77, 1478–79 (giving examples of industry-oriented reform efforts).
324. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 11, at 689–90 (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG: CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) and considering copyright problems on the Internet).
Gervais’s analysis, however, is inapposite to many health and safety problems that require
regulation.
325. See Freeman, supra note 230, at 3, 14–17 (noting “that implementation is
inconsistent, and that enforcement is at best sporadic are by now uncontroversial claims.”);
Solomon, supra note 230, at 822.
326. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND
THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54–71 (2010) (discussing the
“hollow government” problem, in which agency funding stagnates while statutory
responsibilities grow); Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, 5 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 323, 327–28 (2011).
327. Frequent targets include the EPA, FDA, FEC, OSHA, and SEC. But federal
underenforcement of immigration law probably draws the most attention. See, e.g., Adam
Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 534–45
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the effort to pursue violations, they frequently fail to enforce judgments and
settlements.328 Underenforcement is often attributed to agencies being
underfunded and understaffed.329 But agencies may be reluctant to ask for
more resources, lest they signal their own inefficiency or create new pressures
to produce results commensurate with new resources.330 Thus, we lament the
overzealous regulator despite actual evidence that most are not zealous
enough.331
This narrative fits the FDA well. The agency has been criticized for lax
oversight over virtually every product category in its jurisdiction, including
food,332 drugs,333 and medical devices.334 In response, former FDA officials
(2009); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103,
1126–29 (2009). For works that address regulatory underenforcement more generally, see
Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, supra note 326; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA.
L. REV. 93, 116–17 (2005).
328. A remarkable recent study found that regulators systematically undercollect
corporate fines and penalties. See Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap:
Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453,
456, 473–74 (2011) (finding that regulatory agencies “never collect the vast brunt of
regulatory and criminal penalties,” pointing to the Justice Department’s collection rate of
only 4% of its criminal penalties and fines). In 2006, the Justice Department collected $35
billion in penalties and fines. Martha Mendoza & Christopher Sullivan, More Corporations
Stiffing Government on Fines, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2006-03-19-unpaid-fines_x.htm. Federal regulators leave a lot of money
on the table, due to a combination of insufficient resources, insufficient incentives,
institutional malaise, agency capture, and, perhaps, simply confusion. See Ross & Pritikin,
supra, at 496–507.
329. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 230, at 17 (describing how the EPA’s insufficient
funding and personnel trace back to Congress).
330. See Ross & Pritikin, supra note 328, at 502–03. Ross and Pritikin note perceptively
that for agencies, it may be “[b]etter to do poorly with little than risk doing poorly with a
lot,” and that agency leaders may be reluctant “to admit existing deficiencies.” Id. at 502–03.
Conversely, they “may risk funding if they establish that they are doing too well” at collecting
fines. Id. at 503 n.325.
331. This dynamic has been highlighted in other areas, notably for street and violent
crimes. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006).
332. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY: THE ROLE OF THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2010) (criticizing the agency’s piecemeal authority and
oversight over food safety); Diana R.H. Winters, Not Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and
Barriers to Justiciability, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 905, 913–15 (2012).
333. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (2007) (finding major, sometimes structural
deficiencies with the FDA’s approach for regulating the safety of prescription and over-thecounter drugs).
334. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (2011) (finding major flaws with the primary
process by which most medical devices are introduced to the U.S. market).
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argue that the agency suffers from “the hollow government syndrome,”
whereby it is simultaneously saddled not only with expanding jurisdiction,
but also with “stagnant resources and the consequent inability to implement
or enforce its statutory mandates.”335 It can be easy to criticize an
overwhelmed agency.
At the same time, these excuses dissolve the longer a problem lingers.
Underenforcement can negate the value of even optimally timed
regulation.336 It can also erode careful decisions about the proper form and
durability of interventions. The decision to proceed by guidance or even by
more collaborative forms of soft regulation is easier to justify if the agency
provides a traditional hard law backstop via binding rules or enforcement. As
new governance proponents like Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite observe,
“[r]egulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when they are
perceived as carrying big sticks.”337 Thus, while the FDA’s decision to
address software by guidance may have been defensible in 1987 or even
1989, it became less so over time, as software products proliferated and
enforcement continued to lag.
How do these lessons apply to disruptive innovation? Again, this Article
tempers the suggestion that agencies should rely on “threats” as new
technologies mature. The primary example Wu uses is the FCC’s early
Internet policy, which warned Internet service providers to maintain net
neutrality.338 Chairman Powell’s speech warned the broadband industry to
preserve net neutrality.339 But the FCC did not make an empty threat. Just
one year later, the FCC investigated a telephone company for violating one
of these principles,340 citing violations of the Communications Act of 1934.341
Shortly after the settlement, the FCC published a policy statement explaining
335. Peter Barton Hutt, Recent Developments: The State of Science at the Food and Drug
Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008).
336. See Super, supra note 68, at 1404.
337. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 6 (1992); see also Freeman, supra note 230, at 14–17 (critiquing
the EPA’s process of enforcing standards through permits).
338. See Wu, supra note 11. “Net neutrality,” of course, is a phrase Wu coined. Tim Wu,
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
339. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844–45 (citing Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC,
Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for Industry, Remarks at the Silicon
Flatirons Symposium on “The Digital Broadbrand Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime
for the Internet Age” (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf).
340. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1845; Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295
(2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4102/m1/371.
341. Madison River, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4296 (citing the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 201(b)); Weiser, supra note 39, at 563.
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four Internet freedoms,342 which preceded a legally binding rule just six years
later.343 The FCC buttressed the rule by enforcing it.344
Adjudication and enforcement require sustained effort.345 The FDA has
brought intermittent enforcement actions against software products,
particularly via warning letters,346 but it has not pursued enough high-profile
cases to offset its primary reliance on nonbinding (and since withdrawn)
guidance.
Underenforcement can undermine an agency’s credibility, and failure to
enforce can compound other problems for agencies.347 A caution voiced
during a recent FDA public workshop on software products was that if too
many people do not follow the FDA’s rules, they would undermine the entire
system.348 As noted in Part III, this is close to what happened with medical
device software. And history risks repeating itself with the newest generation
of software products for mobile platforms.349
Of course, it is hard to discuss FDA enforcement without appreciating
its gatekeeping authority over new technologies. Agencies, like the FDA, that
enjoy preapproval power can leverage it to better enforce their policies
whether those policies are technically binding or not.350 In the case of
software products, the FDA’s statutory authority to pre-approve and preclear devices gives it gatekeeping authority.351 FDA guidances thus demand
respect. Yet this leverage dissolves when the FDA exempts certain products
from premarket review, as it has with many lower risk categories of devices,

342. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://digital.
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4091/m1/708.
343. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1852; Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905
(Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc39308/m1/451.
344. See Weiser, supra note 39, at 584–89.
345. See id. at 585–86.
346. See, e.g., supra note 140.
347. See Weiser, supra note 39, at 586 (discussing the FCC’s underenforcement).
348. FDA Public Workshop, supra note 80 (Statement of Grant Elliott, Voxiva).
349. Cortez, supra note 78 (drawing parallels between the FDA’s initial approach to
device software and its approach to the latest generation, embodied in mobile medical
applications for smartphones, tablets, and other wireless devices).
350. See Raso, supra note 203, at 803 (noting that the FDA and FCC both enjoy
gatekeeping authority that encourages regulated industries to comply with the agencies’
guidances). See generally CARPENTER, supra note 19. For criticisms of FDA’s gatekeeping
authority over drugs, see C. Frederick Beckner, III, The FDA’s War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J.
529 (1993); Michael P. VanHuysen, Note, Reform of the New Drug Approval Process, 49 ADMIN.
L. REV. 477 (1997).
351. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 510(k), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e (2012).
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like the medical device data systems mentioned above.352 Gatekeeping
leverage is less useful when the product has already passed through the gate,
or when the gates are left wide open.353
So, what is the best way to address suboptimal enforcement by resourcestrapped agencies like the FDA? Some commentators suggest relying on
citizen enforcement and private rights of action.354 Nina Mendelson argues
that expanding such mechanisms could not only increase overall
enforcement, but also redress some of the procedural deficiencies of agencies
relying on guidance documents.355 In effect, we could deputize citizens and
interest groups to use private resources to enforce regulatory obligations that
might otherwise go un- or under-enforced.356
Currently, citizen suits are somewhat rare in administrative enforcement
schemes, outside of environmental statutes.357 Private rights of action are also
rare.358 However, Mendelson argues that “[r]egulatory beneficiaries’ concerns
over inadequate agency enforcement of statutory provisions could be
addressed by expanding citizen enforcement provisions to encompass
obligations under a broader array of health, safety, and environmental
laws.”359 These vehicles would remind agencies that they have constituents
other than industry. They could also combat agency “slack.”360 Of course, it
might be difficult for regulatory beneficiaries to “detect and document”
regulatory violations.361 And there are other problems,362 including the reality
352. Medical Device Data Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 8637 (Feb. 15, 2011) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 880.6310 (2011)).
353. See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 28 (noting that when FDA wants
enforceability, it chooses rulemaking over guidances, particularly when regulation slants
towards postmarket rather than premarket requirements).
354. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 327.
355. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 450–52.
356. See Stephenson, supra note 327, at 107–08.
357. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 185, 191–92 (2000) (discussing private enforcement of environmental laws);
Mendelson, supra note 144, at 450–51 (citing examples of citizen suits).
358. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 451 (noting that the major exceptions occur in
securities and civil rights statutes).
359. Id.
360. Agency “slack” is “the tendency of government regulators to underenforce certain
statutory requirements because of political pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or the
laziness or self-interest of the regulators themselves.” Stephenson, supra note 327, at 110
(internal citations omitted).
361. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 451.
362. See id. at 452 (noting that citizen suits are expensive, may face constitutional
difficulties, and can interfere with agencies’ ability to set their enforcement priorities and
allocate scarce regulatory resources); Stephenson, supra note 327, at 114–20 (listing problems
with private enforcement).
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that private enforcement would probably need to be authorized by
Congress.363 But for consumer products and markets, consumers might serve
as early sentinels of problems.364
In short, agencies need not be so deliberate and tentative with regulating
innovations—even disruptive ones. If agencies are concerned with regulating
prematurely or incorrectly, then they can experiment with timing rules, push
Congress to authorize private enforcement, or try other adaptations of
traditional interventions that reduce the costs of errors. If agencies do choose
to proceed by making threats, then they should use them as a short-term
precursor to more decisive action, as the FCC did, and guard against relying
on them as a long-term crutch, as the FDA did.
V.

CONCLUSION

Periodically, regulators are confronted by novel products, technologies,
or business practices that fall within their jurisdiction but do not fit
comfortably within their regulatory frameworks. Agencies face “regulatory
disruption.” Many scholars and policymakers intuit that the appropriate
response is for regulators to be cautious, not decisive. As Tim Wu recently
argued, agencies should make “threats” to encourage desired behavior or
discourage undesired behavior.
Though intuitive, the idea of using “threats” as a tentative, flexible initial
posture can easily calcify, creating a weak default position that leads to
suboptimal regulation over longer periods. Regulatory inertia can be hard to
break without an external shock, usually a tragedy or massive failure that
reignites interest in regulation.
This discussion implicates not just the FDA’s or the FCC’s consideration
of new technologies, but other agencies’ as well. If agencies are concerned
about regulating novel products or practices prematurely or erroneously, they
can experiment with timing and enforcement methods to reduce the risks of
both. Agencies can use experimental rules, regulatory sunsets, or rulemaking
deadlines to calibrate their approach to novel technologies or business
practices. Also, citizen suits or private rights of action might help correct
systematic underenforcement by resource-strapped regulators, who might
find themselves even more strapped for resources when new products, firms,
or even industries materialize within their jurisdictions.
363. See generally Stephenson, supra note 327 (arguing that Congress should grant such
delegations, and if not, courts should infer it).
364. See id. at 108 (noting that private parties directly affected by regulatory violators’
conduct may be better suited to detection violations).
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The plight of the modern regulator is to adapt old regulatory frameworks
to new technologies and practices. This should not be as paralyzing as it
seems.

